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ABSTRACT
Administrative agencies increasingly enlist the judgment of private
firms they regulate to achieve public ends. Regulation concerning the
identification and reduction of risk—from financial, data and
homeland security risk to the risk of conflicts of interest—increasingly
mandates broad policy outcomes and accords regulated parties wide
discretion in deciding how to interpret and achieve them. Yet the
dominant paradigm of administrative enforcement, monitoring and
threats of punishment, is ill suited to oversee the sound exercise of
judgment and discretion.
This Article argues that this kind of regulation should be viewed,
instead, as regulatory “delegation” of the type Congress makes to
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agencies when it accords them the authority to fill in the details of
ambiguous statutory mandates. Administrative law’s “delegation”
paradigm, unlike its “regulation” counterpart, relies on decision
processes to channel discretion in the service of public goals.
Informed by the comparative capacities of different institutions, it
structures delegated decisionmaking to promote rational and
accountable policy implementation.
The Article then applies this administrative law approach to the
exercise of delegated discretion by regulated firms. Drawing from the
literature on judgment and decisionmaking in organizations used
increasingly by corporate law scholars, it suggests that the efficient
structure of profit-making firms will, in a subset of cases, systemically
blind decisionmakers to the types of risk and change in which
regulation is interested, and lead to unaccountable regulatory
decisions.
Finally, I suggest ways in which administrative law might learn
from recent research on organizational learning that examines how
decisionmaking in firms can be structured more effectively, to
incorporate additional accountability tools through regulatory design,
third-party relationships, and relations between administrative
agencies and those they regulate.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulators increasingly enlist the judgment of the private firms
they regulate to achieve public ends. Whether capital markets
regulation spurred by high-profile fraud, data security and privacy
replies to information technology abuse, or homeland security
responses to new global threats, regulatory measures seek to tame
complex risk by mandating broad policy outcomes, but according
regulated parties wide discretion in deciding how to interpret and
achieve them.
The trend is understandable. Certain complex statutory goals do
not lend themselves easily to traditional regulatory forms. Risk, in
particular, arises from the interplay of a variety of factors and
manifests itself differently in heterogeneous firms. Its regulation,
therefore, often cannot be boiled down to uniform rules governing
1
behavior or mandating particular measurable outcomes. Moreover,
regulators have a poor vantage point for identifying threats on the
ground. They lack access to private information held by regulated
firms. And they face the difficulty and cost of monitoring whether the
internal behavior of any particular firm is likely to achieve desired
outcomes.
In these contexts, therefore, administrative agencies identify a
broad policy goal—“preventing violations” of the securities laws by
2
those supervised by broker-dealer firms, “protect[ing] the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of customer information,”3 or “managing
4
the risks” of the over-the-counter derivatives trade —but leave for
regulated firms the tasks of interpreting the regulatory norm in local

1. In particular, attempts to regulate risk through uniform rules are either underinclusive
in their specificity because focusing on a closed set of specified behaviors invariably neglects
others that might be of greater importance, ignores the systemic interplay between such
behaviors, and directs the attention of the regulated to factors that may or may not be relevant
in a particular case, or meaningless in their generality, for example, “Reduce risk 25 percent.”
2. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i) (2000). The
Securities Exchange Act relieves liability for failure to supervise if “there have been established
procedures, and a system for applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to
prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by such other person.” Id.
3. 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(a) (2006) (Federal Trade Commission regulations implementing
§§ 501 and 505(b)(2) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b),
6805(b)(2) (2000))).
4. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-4(a) (2006) (“An OTC derivatives dealer shall establish,
document, and maintain a system of internal risk management controls to assist it in managing
the risks associated with its business activities, including market, credit, leverage, liquidity, legal,
and operational risks.”).
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context, assessing risk, and determining the appropriate response.
This Article argues that leaving such tasks to the judgment of
regulated firms is analogous to Congress’s delegation to agencies,
through statutory ambiguity, the power to “fill in the details.”
As administrative law recognizes when it comes to agency
5
oversight, it is difficult to regulate the exercise of judgment.
Informed by a sophisticated institutional analysis of decisionmaking
within and between government bodies, therefore, administrative law
uses procedure and structure to shape agency discretion so that it is
accountable: agencies must demonstrate to others that they reached
their decisions consonant with public law values of rationality,
responsiveness, and reviewability. Administrative law, then,
“regulates regulators.”6
In general, however, administrative law’s sophisticated vision of
organizational decisionmaking ends at the doors of the regulated
firm. Despite the institutional focus of its examination of regulators,
administrative law too often conceives of the regulated as unitary
actors that act rationally and purposefully, best motivated by clearly
articulated legal requirements, and external incentives and
7
monitoring.

5. See Paul Seabright, Skill Versus Judgement and the Architecture of Organisations,
44 EUR. ECON. REV. 856 (2000) (discussing the difficulty in codifying standards for, or even
monitoring, the exercise of judgment).
6. Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of
Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2005, Article 4, at 5 (available at
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art4).
7. One notable exception is Richard B. Stewart, Organizational Jurisprudence, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 371 (1987) (reviewing MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A
LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986)), which summarizes and suggests the
importance of several strains of organizational theory. Legal scholars Timothy Malloy and
David Spence have also drawn on sophisticated accounts of organizational behavior in their
analyses of environmental regulation. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the
Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 457 (2003) (“[V]isions of the firm . . . share a common flaw . . . .
[T]hey . . . overlook the ways in which the firm’s internal environment can affect managers’
decisions . . . . [F]irm behavior is driven more by the firm’s routines than by economic rationality
or normative values.”); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and
Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 533 (2002) (“[A]ssum[ing] that the organization is a
monolithic entity that essentially makes decisions as a natural individual would . . . [mean] the
collective nature of the firm and its internal features are largely ignored.”) (footnotes omitted));
David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor
Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 936 (2001) (“[B]ecause environmental
regulation relies on numerous, fluid, vague, and difficult-to-find rules . . . most noncompliance is
neither rational nor a choice.”).
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This approximation of regulated firm behavior might, in many
instances, work well. In traditional command-and-control regulation,
or even newer performance-based directives, for example, regulators
can articulate specific outcomes that are easy to monitor and enforce.
In such contexts, agencies themselves exercise the discretion left by
ambiguous statutes, and the inner workings of regulated firms remain
largely beyond concern.
Yet as regulators turn to regulation that relies less on specific
directives and more on judgment within firm boundaries, a stylized
theory of the firm as a unitary rational actor provides, at best, an
incomplete account of firm decisionmaking. Firms frequently engage
in financial misrepresentation when it is irrational for them to do so in
8
light of the certainty that their behavior will be discovered. Others
with strong organizational incentives to ensure the accuracy of their
internal controls badly misestimate their financial and operational
risk.9 Gatekeepers responsible for the accountability of financial
systems acquiesce in managerial fraud or misrepresentations, risking
legal and market sanctions and loss of reputation that far exceeds any
potential gain. Indeed, the lesson of the investigations into the Enron
fraud and other contemporary misconduct cases was not that one
could find individual “bad apples” within companies, but that a
systemic problem existed. Namely, each of the “watchdogs” in the
“multilayered system of controls devised to protect the public”—even
those without ill intentions—failed to assess accurately or stop the
situation.10

8. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 101 (1997).
9. The notable failure of Long Term Capital Management, for example, resulted from
systemic underestimation of risk despite its leadership by two Nobel-winning economists,
threatening its counterparties and lenders and—some believe—debt markets more generally.
See generally Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189 (1999). Even in the wake of the Enron scandal, 45.9
percent of corporate directors surveyed by the Institute of Internal Auditors and the National
Association of Corporate Directors answered that their organizations had no formal process for
identifying risk, while 17 percent were “not sure.” After Enron: A Survey for Corporate
Directors, 1318 PLI/CORP 563, 571 (2002).
10. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 2 (2002) (concluding
that “[n]ot one of the watchdogs was there to prevent or warn of the impending disaster,”
including Enron’s Board of Directors, Arthur Andersen (Enron’s auditor), investment banking
firms, attorneys, Wall Street securities analysts, credit rating agencies, and the SEC).
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These problems, well documented in the financial context, raise
concern in realms with even higher stakes. Government must, for
example, rely on the judgment of private actors who own and manage
most of the nation’s critical infrastructure holdings to identify, assess,
and mitigate the threats posed by low-probability, high-risk
occurrences like terrorist threats.11 The advantages of addressing
compliance shortcomings ex ante, rather than after catastrophic harm,
are clear.
Because private firms increasingly exercise regulatory discretion
of the type delegated to agencies, administrative law should be
concerned with private firm behavior. In particular, administrative
law should follow the lead of recent corporate law scholarship, and
draw on insights from the management and organizational behavior
literatures to develop a richer account of decisionmaking within the
corporate “black box” and, accordingly, an understanding of the
extent to which firms’ exercise of regulatory discretion is, or is not,
accountable to public norms.
This Article begins that process. It uses those literatures to
identify one cluster of accountability problems raised by regulatory
delegation to private firms. These problems are rooted not in selfinterested calculation about private gain or shortcomings in
normative commitments to legal compliance, but in the less conscious
workings of organizational decision processes. Specifically, efficient
methods of coordinating individuals to achieve firm goals can cause
predictable decision pathologies that mask the very type of risks and
dangers targeted by regulation. Thus, these pathologies are especially
pronounced when regulatory norms cause a drag on efficiency, i.e.,
when those norms are in tension with the core goals around which the
firm is structured. As a result, the combined choices of even wellmeaning individuals can lead to the exercise of regulatory discretion
in ways that are not rational, not responsive to legal goals or

11. “Private industry owns and operates approximately 85 percent of our critical
infrastructures and key assets.” Larry M. Wortzel, Securing America’s Critical Infrastructures:
A Top Priority for the Department of Homeland Security, Address at the Conference for
Critical Infrastructure and Homeland Security: Public Policy Implications for Business (April
23, 2003), in HERITAGE LECTURES NO. 787, May 7, 2003, at 2, available at http://www.heritage.
org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/41362_1.pdf. Because of this the government has
recognized that federal agencies must rely on private companies for the identification of
homeland security risk and protection of critical assets. JOHN MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS: DEFINITION AND
IDENTIFICATION 6 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32631.pdf.
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enforcement efforts, and shielded from review because they result
from unconscious and invisible routines buried deep within firm
structures. In this sense, a firm’s “regulatory decisionmaking” can be
literally arbitrary and capricious, unreviewable, or wholly captured by
private concern.
The Article not only frames a critique of administrative law’s
dominant model of firms, but also suggests a blueprint for thinking
about ways to ameliorate failures in the exercise of regulatory
discretion by substituting a paradigm of administrative accountability
for the traditional model of regulatory compliance. In particular, it
derives a set of accountability tools from the literature on judgment
and decisionmaking, and identifies contexts in which promising
approaches might already exist. These proposals are not intended as
an
exclusive
accountability
schema
for
regulated-firm
decisionmaking; they address only the cognitively-rooted threats to
good decisionmaking when it is otherwise difficult to measure
substantive outcomes. Accordingly, they suggest a framework to
guide agencies in experimenting more generally with integrating
cognitive understandings into the regulation of decision processes.
This framework should include regulated firms as part of the
administrative process. In making this claim, this Article offers an
additional dimension to scholarship on the role of private actors in
lawmaking. That scholarship focuses on a combination of
mechanisms, notably contract and consensus, by which government
administrators enlist private parties to perform traditionally public
functions ranging from standard setting to the administration of
12
prisons. It suggests that privatization, in the language of
administrative law, is a form of delegation that raises accountability
13
concerns. By identifying ways in which regulation, too, can
constitute delegation, I argue that decisions assigned to regulated
firms should also be viewed through an accountability lens.

12. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD (2002); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role] (discussing private role in service
provision, regulation and incarceration); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative
Governance] (describing how a flexible EPA permitting process has allowed private companies
to devise a more adaptive permitting regime).
13. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1370–71
(2003).
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the trend
toward regulatory delegation and the resulting challenge to the
dominant paradigm of regulatory “compliance,” by which regulators
seek to affect the behavior of regulated entities through monitoring
and incentives. It argues that regulatory delegation is better governed
by a different model: the accountability paradigm used for structuring
legislative delegations to administrative agencies.
Part II presents an account of the way decisions occur within
firms, and identifies particular accountability problems with firms’
exercise of regulatory discretion. More specifically, it describes how
corporate structures, mindsets, and routines developed to allow
efficient firm behavior can skew compliance efforts by filtering out
the very information about risk and change that regulation seeks to
identify. This filtering can both result in arbitrary or unresponsive
regulatory decisions, and preclude their meaningful review.
Part III uses the literature on how organizations learn to develop
tools for increasing the accountability of regulated firm decisions, and
suggests three contexts in which they can be implemented. First, it
argues that those tools can be used in regulatory design to focus the
attention of individuals within the firm, and therefore prompt them to
make more rational regulatory decisions. For example, the Sarbanes14
Oxley Act’s expansion of federal securities regulation contains a
number of provisions with promise as “attention regulation.” Second,
it explores ways in which relations with third-party monitors might
better be utilized to overcome cognitive decisionmaking pathologies.
Finally, this Part suggests a model for reworking the relationship
between regulators and firms to augment the agency’s role as
educator. In sum, this Part offers a blueprint for thinking about how
best to enlist the judgment of private firms—those with the most onthe-ground information about risk in a variety of contexts—to
achieve public ends while avoiding pathologies that distort that
judgment
I. REGULATORY DELEGATION
Regulatory responses to this decade’s high-profile governance
challenges sound a consistent theme: they blur the customary roles of
regulators and those who are regulated. Traditionally, public

14. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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administrative agencies are delegated wide discretion to flesh out
broad legislative goals. Private parties are in turn regulated by
provisions mandating their conduct accordingly. Faced with a host of
contexts in which it is difficult to mandate specific outcomes from
above, however, regulators increasingly assign to regulated private
firms important decisions about the definition of those goals and how
to achieve them. Regulators no longer command, they delegate.
Private firms are no longer simply regulated; they are often assigned
discretion to fill in regulatory detail analogous to the type exercised
by administrative agencies.
The blurring between regulation and delegation poses a
challenge to the traditional paradigm for the legal control of
regulated firm behavior. That paradigm uses traditional mechanisms
of control—regulatory specificity, monitoring, and incentives—to
mandate compliance with regulatory commands. When specific
commands are replaced with regulatory delegation, however, these
mechanisms are less useful. Because it makes little sense to speak
about “compliance with” the exercise of decisionmaking discretion,
such mechanisms often provide only illusory constraints on private
firm choices, leaving open the possibility that public norms will be
subverted by private decisions.
When regulation resembles administrative delegation, then, a
more useful model for the legal control of regulatory implementation
is often the web of mechanisms employed to make the bureaucratic
exercise of delegated authority accountable. The accountability
paradigm offers a means to glean the benefits of regulatory
delegation when private actors claim superior information and
expertise, while at the same time cabining private discretion by
making firms answerable to others for decisions that should be made
consistent with substantive public norms.
A. The Trend Toward Regulatory Delegation
Traditional regulation seeks to achieve particular outcomes by
articulating, ex ante, universal rules requiring certain conduct or
particular technology. Such command-and-control regulation conveys
little discretion to regulated parties in implementation; they can
either comply with the regulatory requirements, or fail to do so.
This type of regulation proves less operative when regulatory
goals are more complex. Specific rules often cannot reflect the large
number of variables involved in achieving multifaceted regulatory
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goals, such as reducing the types of risk produced by a combination of
15
factors. They identify certain relevant factors that can easily be
codified, while ignoring others. They thus direct behavior toward
compliance with an incomplete set of detailed provisions that may
frustrate, rather than further, the broader regulatory goal in any
particular circumstance.16
The problem is compounded when regulated entities are
heterogeneous, and contexts are varied.17 One-size-fits-all rules
cannot easily account for the ways in which risk manifests itself
differently across firms. Moreover, regulators have neither the
resources nor the vantage to attain the granular knowledge necessary
to combat risk within individual companies; the uncertainty in
predicting such individualized information further renders it
unsuitable as a basis for ex ante mandates.
Indeed, as demonstrated by a growing body of empirical and
analytic research in the literature on regulation, when regulators
attempt to reflect the breadth of uncertain contextual factors in a
regime of precise provisions, the proliferation of rules itself creates an
unwieldy, confusing body of mandates and exceptions leading to

15. See Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE
J. ON REG. 535, 570–71, 590, 598–600 (1996) (discussing rule failure in regulating the health risks
of seafood, where context regulation of outcomes is not possible and causes of risk are
innumerable and heterogeneous); Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation 13–16
(London Sch. of Econ. and Political Sci., Econ. and Soc. Research Council, Ctr. for the Analysis
of Risk and Regulation Discussion Paper 2002) (discussing the increase in the use of regulation
to govern the management and distribution of risk, with particular reference to financial
services regulation). See generally D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers in the Legal Order: The
Exercise of Discretionary Powers, in A READER ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 275, 277 (D.J.
Galligan ed., 1996) (discussing the changes in the nature of tasks undertaken by the state and
the resulting tendency toward “purposive, goal-based decisions” informed by substantive, rather
than formal, rationality, and “therefore towards discretionary authority”). Susan Sturm has
detailed this problem in achieving the abstract goal of workplace equity. See Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
458, 461 (2001) (discussing the problems with regulating the “complex and dynamic problems
inherent” in workplace bias with “specific, across-the-board rules”).
16. Carol A. Heimer, Legislating Responsibility 5–6 (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No.
9711, 1997) (discussing how the “30-day rule” in neonatology clinic, under which additional
administrative burdens were imposed if a newborn died before 30 days, encouraged efforts
targeted on survival for that length of time, with no effect on long-term survival rates).
17. The shortcomings of command and control governance are well recognized. See, e.g.,
Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 40 DUKE L.J. 607, 627 (1991) (citing failures in using
“rigid, highly bureaucratized ‘command-and-control’ regulation” to govern “hundreds,
thousands, or even millions of companies and individuals in an exceptionally diverse nation”).

01__BAMBERGER.DOC

388

12/19/2006 5:06 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:377

18
uncertain and inconsistent application. Because of such rule failure,
regulatory precision is often a poor device for allocating decisions
between rule makers and rule followers,19 and therefore for ensuring
20
consistency in the behavior of regulated parties.
The extensive literature on the economics of contracts identifies
such problems with “complete” contracting—attempting to fully
articulate terms ex ante—in situations of complexity and
21
uncertainty. In such circumstances, an instrument’s terms should be
left incomplete—vague and unspecified—while future decisions about
how to fill in the imprecision may be assigned to the party that will, at
the appropriate time, have best access to relevant information.22
These insights have shaped choices about regulatory design.
Indeed, the past two decades have seen widespread experimentation
with more “incomplete” regulatory instruments. Regulators employ

18. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27
AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 47, 60–75 (2002) (showing, based on a comparative study of the
regulation of nursing homes in the United States and Australia, how a regulatory regime based
on the proliferation of detailed rules creates an unwieldy, confusing body of rules and
exceptions, leading to uncertain and inconsistent applications); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91
GEO. L.J. 757, 805 (2003) (describing the problem of regulatory accretion, whereby the “system
burdens” arising from the collective operation of rules thwart a regulated organization’s ability
to comply); Spence, supra note 7, at 918 (discussing the “complexity critique” of regulation,
which “see[s] a complex, ‘ossified’ system [of regulation] that often makes compliance difficult
and impractical”); Sturm, supra note 15, at 461 (describing how in a complex system like
employment discrimination, rules will be too general).
19. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L.
REV. 303, 305 (suggesting that the choice between specific and vague directives does not make
nearly as much of a difference as is ordinarily assumed because “the adaptive behaviour of ruleinterpreters and rule-enforcers will push rules towards standards, and push standards towards
rules”).
20. Indeed, these problems trouble principal-agent relationships generally. See Darren
Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, How Agents Matter, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 199, 206 (Darren Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) (“Although the
use of particular rules is a control mechanism . . . . [n]o set of rules can be completely precise nor
cover all contingencies; thus, there is always room for interpretation. Principals of course have
the capacity to interpret the rules to their advantage, but so do agents. . . . Once substantial
delegation occurs . . . . agents are more likely . . . to openly reinterpret their mandate . . . .”).
21. See generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the
Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. L. REV. 187, 191 (2005) (“In contract theory,
incompleteness is due to the fact that information is costly and sometimes unavailable to (a) the
parties at the time of contracting or (b) the parties or the enforcing court at the time of
enforcement.”).
22. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 34 (1985) (discussing “governance structures”
put into place to resolve future contractual uncertainty).
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performance-based measures when they can identify specific
outcomes but cannot easily codify in generally-applicable rules the
23
means for achieving them. Such regulation articulates a measurable
result, but leaves “the concrete measures to achieve this end open for
24
the [regulated entity] to adapt to varying local circumstances.”
Accordingly, it assigns the determination of required outcomes to the
regulator—who can, ex ante, determine the desired result with
specificity—but leaves contemporaneous implementation decisions to
the regulated entity itself, which is more familiar with inner firm
workings on which desired outcomes hinge. By executive order,
Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush have directed agencies, when
feasible, to regulate by mandating performance objectives, rather
than behavior,25 and much regulation of complicated subject matter
takes this form.
Certain public problems, however, lend themselves to neither
specific behavioral commands nor measurable outcomes. Their harms
arise in heterogeneous contexts and result from a complex interaction
of events or behaviors that cannot be identified ex ante. Moreover,
desired performance is difficult to identify in advance or assess
contemporaneously. In these circumstances, outcomes (whether the
regulated party successfully stopped a data privacy or homeland
security breach, for example) are, in one scholar’s understated words,
“undesirable to rely upon as the sole basis for a regulatory
26
standard.”
Prominent twenty-first-century regulatory initiatives have
focused on such targets. Animated by a series of scandals and
disasters in the forefront of the public consciousness—specifically
Enron and WorldCom, the repeated compromise of private or

23. See generally Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and
Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705 (2003)
(summarizing a dialogue among regulators and researchers about performance-based
regulation); Christine Parker, Reinventing Regulation Within the Corporation: ComplianceOriented Regulatory Innovation, 32 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 529, 547 (2000) (discussing “outcomebased” regulation).
24. NEIL GUNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING WORKPLACE SAFETY:
SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS 23 (1999).
25. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(8), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000) (issued by President Clinton and retained by President George W. Bush).
26. Cary Coglianese, Reducing Risk with Management-Based Regulation, Notes on the
Columbia/Wharton-Penn Roundtable on Risk Management Strategies 2 (2002),
http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/chrr/documents/meetings/roundtable/pdf/notes/coglianese_cary_
note.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
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secured data, and the World Trade Center attacks—regulators have
turned their attention to preventing, and not just punishing, capital
markets abuses, data breaches, and security compromises. These
initiatives regulate issues of immense financial and societal
importance. Yet their goals involve, in large part, the reduction of
complex risks about which advance information is uncertain at best,
in varied contexts about which administrators know far less than the
entities they seek to regulate.
Responding to these problems, regulators have shied away from
regulatory detail as to either outcomes or methods. Expanding on
regulatory models documented by Cary Coglianese and others in the
27
fields of environmental protection and food safety, they have instead
enlisted the expertise and judgment of regulated parties themselves—
those entities claiming the greatest familiarity with risks on the
ground, how those risks arise, and how they can be mediated—to
determine not just the means to achieve regulatory goals, but also the
definition of those aims in particular contexts, and the monitoring of
achievement.
This development has been particularly marked in the securities
realm, in which SEC regulations requiring the disclosure of
operational risk generally have implicitly left to regulated firms the
tasks of developing systems for identifying and assessing risk. These
assignments have now become explicit, as in the Sarbanes-Oxley
regime discussed in greater detail in Part III.C and the 2003 SEC rule
targeting conflicts of interest on the part of investment advisers who
exercise voting authority with respect to client securities. The
conflicts rule sets a policy goal: it requires advisers to adopt policies
and procedures “reasonably designed to ensure that [the adviser]
28
vote[s] . . . in the best interest of clients.” The Commission, however,
left the substantive detail to regulated advisers, expressly refusing to
provide any further specifics. Indeed, the SEC would provide no
“specific policies or procedures for advisers,” nor even “a list of

27. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 696–700 (2003)
(describing the use of management-based regulation in the areas of food safety, industrial
safety, and pollution prevention).
28. Investment Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–6(a) (2006).
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approved procedures,” recognizing that investment advisers “are so
29
varied that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is unworkable.”
Measures seeking to safeguard sensitive personal and financial
information reflect a similar direction. Title V of the Gramm-Leach30
Bliley Act (GLB) empowers various agencies to promulgate data
31
security regulations for financial institutions. The Federal Trade
Commission’s 2003 standard implementing the Act in turn instructs
firms to develop risk assessment and data security systems
“appropriate to your size and complexity, the nature and scope of
your activities, and the sensitivity of any customer information at
issue.”32 While the implementing regulations do include some
guidance for implementation tools, such as “periodic risk
assessments,” and “sanctions against employees that fail to comply,”
the particular implementation is left to individual firms, and “[t]he
ultimate test remains a broad one, that of ‘reasonable data
security.’”33 The proposed Identity Theft Protection Act,34 and
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005,35 each reported out
of Senate committee, would impose information security
36
requirements that track the regulatory implementation of the GLB.
Finally, regulators struggling for regulatory responses to
homeland security threats in the face of international terrorism
recognize that government must rely on the judgment of private
actors—who own and operate approximately 85 percent of U.S.
37
critical infrastructures and key assets —for the ongoing assessment,
identification and mitigation of the risks connected with such low-

29. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Mar. 10, 2003)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
30. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6827 (2000)).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6805.
32. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2006).
33. Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2007) (manuscript at 7, on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(quoting Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards, 69 Fed. Reg.
77,620 (Dec. 28, 2004)).
34. S. 1408, 109th Cong. (2005) (approved by the Senate Commerce Committee in July
2005 and reported to the full Senate in December 2005).
35. S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005) (reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee in
November 2005).
36. Ira Rubinstein, Privacy and Security Legislation and Policy: The Last 12 Months, in
SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: EVOLVING LAWS AND PRACTICES IN A
SECURITY-DRIVEN WORLD 76–78 (Francois Gilbert et al. eds., 2006).
37. Wortzel, supra note 11, at 2.
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38
probability, high-risk disasters. Thus, while regulation in this arena is
more diffuse and less developed, regulators are experimenting with
regimes such as New Jersey’s chemical plant protection measures,
which turn principally to regulated plants themselves for the
“assessment of facility vulnerabilities and hazards that might be
exploited by potential terrorists,” and the development of
“prevention, preparedness, and response plan[s]” including measures
“to eliminate or minimize risk of terrorist attack, to mitigate the
consequences of any attack that does occur, or to respond to an
attack that does occur.”39
Although these initiatives address a variety of substantive ills,
they share certain important characteristics. Each articulates general
goals, yet largely assigns to regulated firms themselves the decisions
about specifics—everything from the meaning of the public aim in
particular context (mitigating risk, avoiding conflicts of interest,
protecting information, enhancing security) to the means for
achieving it. Certainly, some measures require that regulated firms
employ certain management processes. Yet they make few ex ante
decisions about substantive detail, leaving such decisions—at least in
the first instance—to the regulated firm’s judgment.
Such developments signal a shift in the vision of the regulated
entity. Regulated parties are increasingly no longer just the objects of
governance, enlisted for “transmission-belt” implementation of clear
regulatory mandates. They are partners in regulation, implicitly and
explicitly enlisted to fill out the substance of legal norms and develop
the means for implementing those broader principles locally

B. Regulatory Delegation and Traditional Compliance Models
This shift in the role of the regulated entity poses a serious
challenge to the ways in which regulators and scholars traditionally
think about firms and their compliance with legal mandates. In a
world in which regulation mandated observable conduct or outcomes,
regulators relied on traditional tools for principals’ control of agent
behavior: making rules as specific as possible, monitoring
performance to ensure those rules were followed, and providing

38.
39.

See MOTEFF & PARFOMAK, supra note 11.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DOMESTIC SECURITY PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE,
DOMESTIC SECURITY PREPAREDNESS BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS AT TCPA/DPCC
CHEMICAL SECTOR FACILITIES 4–5 (2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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appropriate incentives—both carrots and sticks—for desired
40
behavior.
This suite of restraints reflects the two existing visions that
41
dominate administrative law understandings of private parties. One
emphasizes a firm’s normative commitment to compliance. The other
emphasizes compliance based on instrumental calculations. Because
of their emphasis on the measurement of externally observable
regulatory requirements, however, neither concerns itself with
detailed understandings of behavior and decisionmaking within the
black box of firm boundaries. When thinking about firms’ exercise of
regulatory delegation—which inherently involves complex behavioral
interactions between individuals and systems within firms—both
come up short.
1. Prevailing Compliance Models of Firm Behavior. The first
traditional model dominating administrative law understandings of
private firm behavior describes regulated firms as “amoral
calculators,”42 profit-maximizing actors who decide whether to comply
with the law based on a calculation of the costs and benefits of doing
so.43 Such firms’ behavior can therefore best be controlled by “topdown” measures associated with principal-agent relationships:
adjusting incentives so as to align the interests of regulated-agents
with those of the regulator-principal.44 The primary means for
affecting firm incentives involves deterrence: using monitoring and
sanctions (fines or imprisonment) to set the cost and likelihood of ex
post punishment sufficiently high so as to deter ex ante deviation
45
from the regulator’s command. Certain administrative agencies, such

40. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing, in the
context of corporate shareholders and managers, market and contract controls designed to align
the divergent interests of principals and agents).
41. James Salzman et al., Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 WYO. L. REV. 253, 255 (2002).
42. Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The “Criminology of the Corporation” and
Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 67, 69–74 (Keith Hawkins &
John M. Thomas eds., 1984); see also Spence, supra note 7, at 919–23 (discussing the “rational
polluter” model of compliance to environmental regulation).
43. See generally Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, supra note 7, at 453–54 &
nn.9–11 (discussing the vision of a “firm as a rational profit-maximizer, obeying the law only
when it is in the firm’s best economic interest to do so” and associated literature).
44. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 40.
45. For classic statements of the deterrence approach, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 201–27 (1986); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
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as the SEC, include positive carrots along with punitive sticks in the
incentive model, offering a reduction in punishment for those
46
regulated firms that demonstrate good faith attempts at compliance.
In either form, this behavioral model reflects economist Oliver
Williamson’s classic definition of agents: opportunistic actors “given
to self-interest seeking with guile.”47
The latter account, then, builds explicitly on the behavioral
paradigm of the self-interested, utility-maximizing individual—the
archetype embraced by “[v]irtually all of modern economics and large
parts of the rest of social science.”48 Under this model, individual
decisionmakers approach choices armed with knowledge of the
available alternatives and their consequences. In addition,
decisionmakers have a consistent hierarchy of “preferences,” which
are “consistent values by which alternative consequences of action
can be compared in terms of their subjective value.”49 By assessing
alternative consequences in light of her preferences, the utility
maximizer will make the choice that maximizes her own utility by
choosing the greatest benefit at least cost (or, more accurately, the
highest net benefit and the highest probability of occurrence). This
model, accordingly, supposes a consequentialist model of
decisionmaking, by which individuals make choices based on a
calculated evaluation of the outcomes of various strategies.
The amoral calculator account of regulated entities attributes this
pattern of individual economic behavior to the firm as a whole. It
assumes that all regulated parties, whether individuals or
organizations, make rational calculative choices. The prevailing
administrative account of the firm, then, is that of a unitary selfinterested actor, rationally structuring decisions in order to maximize
50
profit. Consistent with the utility-maximizing model, incentives, if set
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement
of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).
46. See, e.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001)
(declining to take action against company because of internal control efforts and cooperation).
47. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 253 (1996).
48. James G. March, Understanding How Decisions Happen in Organizations, in
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 10 (Zur Shapira ed., 1997).
49. Id. See generally DECISION MAKING: ALTERNATIVES TO RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS
(Mary Zey ed., 1992).
50. Spence, supra note 7, at 918 (“The traditional view holds that firms are rational and
self-interested economic and political actors, and rational pursuit of their self-interest guides
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at the right level, will guide organizational decisionmaking by causing
organizations to undertake whatever internal adjustments are
necessary to ensure that they conform their behavior to the legal
51
rule.
The second of the prevailing compliance models focuses on
52
regulated parties who are “good apples.” These are agents for whom
conformity with the law derives from “bottom-up” commitments,
which legal sociologists credit for much, if not most, legal
compliance.53 These firms comport their behavior, of their own
accord, to comply with the law to the extent possible.54 Because these
agents are hindered principally by external obstacles to compliance
such as “ambiguous regulations, constantly shifting rules, and
conflicting mandates,”55 regulators can best control these agents by
providing clear rules to guide their behavior.
These two models offer divergent motivational accounts.
Whereas the amoral calculator is motivated by self-interest, the good
apple is guided by a normative preference for legal compliance.56

both their compliance decisions and their attempts to influence policy.”); see also Milton
Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 21–
22 (1953) (examining the hypothesis that individual firms behave as if they were seeking
rationally to maximize profits); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 18, at 797 (“[Environmental
behavior] is portrayed as merely the result of a rationally derived decision whether or not to
comply—that is, based on the perceived costs of complying versus the risk and costs of being
caught, the ‘good apples’ decide it is efficient to comply and the ‘bad apples’ decide it is efficient
to violate.”).
51. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 693 (1997) (“[E]ntity liability
can lead companies to institute ‘preventive measures’ that deter by making misconduct more
difficult or expensive for wrongdoers, or by reducing the illicit benefits of unpunished (or
successful) misconduct, without affecting the probability that it is detected by enforcement
officials.”).
52. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 64–66 (1982) (arguing that most regulated enterprises are
“good apples”).
53. Id.
54. Salzman et al., supra note 41, at 255; see also Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the
Firm, supra note 7, at 454 (describing vision of the firm as “law-abiding actor, struggling in good
faith to comply with increasingly complicated and contradictory laws and regulations”).
55. Salzman et al., supra note 41, at 255.
56. See, e.g., Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, supra note 7, at 464–75 (“In the
normative model, people comply with the law not out of a fear of formal legal sanctions but out
of a sense of obligation arising from a social norm.”); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1497 (1998) (discussing the “norm of
law abidingness”).
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Yet the two share similar understandings about firm behavior.
The normative account mirrors the consequentialist’s assumption that
organizations structure decisionmaking rationally, so as to conform
57
behavior to legal commands. They both assume that firms reach
decisions consciously and purposively.58 And they both
anthropomorphize the firm, attributing to organizations the unitary
decisionmaking patterns of individuals.
The ability of both models to rely on rule precision, monitoring,
and incentives to ensure observable compliance with specific
commands, then, permits them to treat firms as atomistic, rational,
purposive decisionmakers. It further obviates the need, in either case,
to look within the “black box” of the firm to understand the ways in
which decisionmaking actually occurs.
2. Regulatory Delegation’s Challenge to Compliance Models.
The delegation of regulatory discretion poses a challenge for the
prevailing accounts of firm behavior. The existing compliance
paradigm relies on some firms’ normative commitment to follow
specific mandates, and other firms’ responsiveness to incentives and
monitoring. Experience with delegation to administrative agencies,
however, suggests that these elements alone are insufficient to guide
organizations’ exercise of broad regulatory discretion.
Certainly, the dominant model of control and the behavioral
premise of rational purposive action by regulated firms on which it
rests explain important elements of firm behavior, regardless of the
level of discretion delegated. Business organizations are generally
sensitive to profits, and therefore to government penalties. They are
often able to organize their operations to respond successfully to
market pressures, and to pursue the strategic and normative goals set
forth by management. Moreover, the delegation of decisionmaking
discretion to private firms does not change their nature as parties who
must follow the law. Thus imposing civil or criminal penalties
provides an important means of ex post punishment for the bad
apples who violate regulatory mandates.
57. See, e.g., BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 52, at 64–65 (making the case that the “good
apples” have the strongest conception of the link between compliance and long-term selfinterest, and the most effective internal controls to achieve regulatory compliance).
58. See Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive
Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 480 (“[T]he normative
or moral decision-making model agrees with rational choice theory’s claim that people generally
make conscious and systematic decisions . . . .”).
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Yet experience suggests that these approaches are, at best,
imprecise controls on private firm decisionmaking. Firms engage in
financial misrepresentation even when discovery and punishment is
virtually assured. Even good-apple firms that seek to implement
effective internal controls fail to comply with regulatory mandates.
Especially in contexts in which regulatory delegation is prevalent,
59
traditional models of control fare poorly.
Some of the imprecision in control may be addressed by
overcoming the challenges inherent in the tools themselves: the
60
difficulties of determining optimal incentives for deterrence, the
61
challenge and costs of effective monitoring, and the complexity of
promoting independent norms of law abidingness in business firms.
Indeed, regulation has integrated creative means both for better
aligning the incentives of private actors with government (such as
regulatory schemes that rely on market-based incentives rather than
deterrence62) and for improving monitoring of outcomes (by, for

59. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY
RESPONSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 4 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d03138.pdf (finding that, between January 1997 and June 2002, 10 percent of all listed
companies announced at least one financial restatement, and that financial restatements due to
prior irregularities grew 145 percent); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 18, at 791–96 (“[F]ull
compliance with regulatory mandates is seldom achieved.”); id. at 823–24 (“[E]very compliance
study of environmental law to date has revealed significant levels of noncompliance.”); Joyce E.
Cutler, Large Number of Companies Noncompliant with Environmental Laws, EPA Official
Says, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2233 (1999); James Surowiecki, The Dirty Little Truth About
Corporate Lies, SLATE, July 6, 1998, http://www.slate.com/id/1001803/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2006)
(discussing survey of CFOs indicating that 12 percent admitted misrepresenting corporate
financial results at the request of senior company executives, and another 55 percent had been
asked to misrepresent results, but had “fought off” the demand).
60. The difficulty in setting optimal incentives to ensure deterrence proves a challenge
because, to determine the right penalty level, a regulator needs to calculate accurately the costs
of compliance, as well as the probability of detection and enforcement. Such detailed
information may simply be inaccessible to public administrators, especially because these costs
vary radically by firm. See DOUGLAS NEEDHAM, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
REGULATION: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH 335 (1983) (discussing regulators’ inability to know
actual costs and benefits when setting incentives). See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW 22–23, 67 (1990) (noting “practical difficulties of implementing a policy based
only on the increased use of threatened or delivered punishment”); Tom R. Tyler, Public
Mistrust of the Law, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 857–58 (1998) (noting that deterrence is difficult
because it depends on the likelihood of being caught); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent, 45 AM.
J. COMP. L. 871, 873–74 (1997) (highlighting the high costs of deterrence).
61. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 80–81 (“[M]onitoring is a far more
difficult and costly practice than we conventionally assume.”).
62. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342–43 (1985) (advocating marketable permits in part on the ground that
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example, focusing on the independence of third-party auditors).
Administrative agencies have also experimented with innovations
intended to promote normative commitments to compliance. For
example, programs under which regulated firms may negotiate the
content of applicable rules, seek (among other things) to promote
those businesses’ acceptance of the legal mandate.63 Moreover, agency
programs that publicize high levels of compliance are calculated to
convince regulated parties of the fairness of regulatory regimes. Legal
sociologists have found this to increase a decisionmaker’s sense of
64
normative duty.
Yet shortcomings of models relying either on top-down
incentives or bottom-up faith inhere in the approaches themselves. As
in the administrative agency context, the very nature of broad
delegation blunts the applicability of two of the standard control
mechanisms. By definition, a regime that accords regulated parties
wide discretion relinquishes its effectiveness as a precise directive.
Similarly, the more a regulation prescribes broad policy goals, rather
than specific behavior or a measurable outcome, the more difficult it
is to monitor compliance. As discussed in Part I.A., attempts to boil
down complex goals to auditable tasks often thwart the
accomplishment of the wider objective.

marketability puts the regulatory information-processing burden on “business managers and
engineers who are in the best position to figure out how to cut back on their plants’ pollution
costs”); Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Law and Policy 33–43 (John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Working Paper No. RWP04-023, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=552043 (discussing a number of alternative means of adjusting incentives, including
pollution charges, tradable permit systems, market friction reductions, and government subsidy
reductions).
63. See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation No. 82-4),
1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1993) (expressing expectation that negotiated rulemaking would result in
rules more acceptable to the interests affected by agency decisions). But see Cary Coglianese,
Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J.
1255, 1335 (1997) (concluding on the basis of empirical study that “[n]egotiated rulemaking does
not appear any more capable of . . . avoiding litigation than do the rulemaking procedures
ordinarily used by agencies”).
64. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law, 133 SWISS J.
ECON. & STAT. 219, 220–22 (1997). That same result is achieved when a decisionmaker believes
that most others are behaving according to the same norm, see Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 341–42 (2001) (“In sum, individuals behave like the
amoral calculators posited by the conventional theory only when they believe that others are
cheaters; if they believe that others are morally motivated to comply, they reciprocate by
complying in turn, whether or not they believe that they could profitably evade.”), and that
those who are not are being punished.
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Private firm agents, furthermore, possess characteristics
indicating particular incentives to exploit the “slack” inherent in their
delegation. They are structured around strong corporate selfinterest—the very interest the legal and economic literatures are most
65
concerned will capture public decisionmaking. And they are
66
“permeable,” in that they are particularly responsive to influences
other than the interests of regulator-principal, such as the behavior of
competitors, the interests of consumers, and the pressures of the
market.
Finally, the information asymmetries between regulated firms
and administrative agencies—one of the important justifications for
employing regulatory delegations in the first place—prevents
effective monitoring. Not only do regulated entities possess superior
knowledge about the workings of their organization, their behavior is
often, by practical constraints or even by operation of law, more
effectively hidden within the firm.
These factors all suggest the insufficiency of incentives, imperfect
monitoring, and faith in good apples to guide private implementation
of broad and imprecise public mandates. Certainly regulatory
delegation creates the opportunity for individual firms to participate
creatively in developing effective governance solutions, and some
firms might seize the chance. Yet relying on the trappings of a
traditional enforcement framework to ensure an across-the-board
pursuit of public norms provides only illusory control of firm
behavior; it leaves too much to chance.
C. Drawing from a Different Model: The Administrative
Accountability Paradigm
The mismatch between regulatory delegation and traditional
methods for administrative control of regulated parties should not
pose much surprise to scholars of administrative behavior. Indeed,
the difficulty in “commanding” and “controlling” broad
decisionmaking discretion constitutes the central focus of
administrative law.

65. See infra note 80 (citing the literature on capture of administrative processes by private
interests).
66. See Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 20, at 208–10 (discussing ways in which agents are
permeable to third parties).
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Specifically, administrative law concerns itself with ways to shape
policy decisions that Congress delegates to the judgment of
administrative agencies, bodies largely unanticipated by the
67
Constitution’s three-branch framework yet essential to the massive
project of modern governance. Traditional legislative delegation
frequently involves contexts in which there is little ability to monitor
particular outcomes. The administrative state accordingly turns to
agencies to use their judgment, informed by difficult-to-measure
factors such as expertise and executive politics.
Administrative law recognizes that the exercise of such judgment
is difficult to police. Accordingly, it has long abandoned notions of
straightforward agency compliance with legislative mandate.68 Instead,
it is animated by a model of agency accountability.
Indeed, when the ex post measurement of outcomes is elusive, or
outcomes are insufficient as a means for assessing decisionmaking,
the accountability model rejects singular reliance on traditional
principal-agent control tools. It relies instead on a robust set of
doctrines, procedures, and relationships intended to channel
decisionmaking in ways that promote both more effective
decisionmaking in the service of public goals, and independent values
about the ways in which public norms should be pursued. Specifically,
the accountability paradigm regulates decisionmaking to promote
rationality, responsiveness to public norms, and reviewability by
others.
The accountability model provides a useful blueprint for the
oversight of regulatory delegation. It takes seriously the notions that
policy solutions are complicated and varied, and that parties to whom
discretion is given should employ their knowledge and judgment in
the service of effective solutions. It further recognizes that
organizational decisionmakers do not behave in any one singular
manner—let alone in the manner of a rational maximizer; rather,
organizational decisionmaking is complex, and can only be affected
through a combination of inexact means. Exploring this framework
for making administrative delegatees answer for decisionmaking

67. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 328, 370–71 (2001) (providing summary of discourse regarding the place of agencies in
constitutional structure).
68. See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (discussing the “transmission-belt” model
of the administrative state).
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offers important guidance when those same actors in turn delegate
decisions to those they regulate.
1. Administrative Delegation. The administrative state governs
69
through delegation. Congress possesses exclusive power to legislate
regulatory principles and priorities, but lacks both the constitutional
capacity to execute laws and the resources to shape legislative
principle into particularized policies. By delegating significant
policymaking discretion to administrative agencies to supply the
practical detail necessary for regulatory implementation, however, it
enlists their relative expertise, ability to research and collect pertinent
information, and capacity to devote extended time and attention to
specific problems.70
Administrative law’s vision of agency decisionmaking has
transformed to reflect developments in governance. The “traditional
model” conceived of the “agency as a mere transmission belt for
71
implementing legislative directives in particular cases.”
Congressional dictates guaranteed that agency action was
72
“commanded by a legitimate source of authority—the legislature.”
73
The “additional assurance” of judicial review further “ensure[d]
74
compliance with legislative directives.”
The very idiom of the traditional model, however, rings hollow in
an era when federal legislation charging administrative agencies with
broad goals has long eliminated the specificity on which the

69. The delegation of authority may either occur explicitly, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“[When Congress has] explicitly
left a gap for [an] agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”), or implicitly, by assigning to
agencies the task of administering statutes containing some ambiguity or “gap,” United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent:
Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1281–82 (2002)
(discussing implications of implicit administrative delegation).
70. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on
Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 427–30 (1989) (noting the transformation in practice
accompanying the rise of the administrative state from “direct (‘transitive’) legislative resolution
of policy problems to indirect (‘intransitive’) resolution through the empowerment of agents”).
71. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1675 (1975).
72. Id. at 1675; see also id. at 1672–74 (describing how specific directives curb official
discretion, promote formal justice, and ensure the legitimacy of governmental actions).
73. Id. at 1675.
74. Id. at 1676.
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75
“transmission belt” theory relied. Congress now explicitly assigns
agencies future decisions for which the details cannot be determined
in advance. Administrative policymakers are asked instead to
exercise good judgment—informed by expertise and information to
which they have access—in choosing between a variety of possible
options under conditions of uncertainty. In this light, a model of
“controlling” agency “compliance” makes little sense.76 Judgment is
an activity that is difficult to control, and discretion is inherent in its
exercise.
Modern administrative law has, accordingly, focused its attention
instead on problems raised by the exercise of discretion—problems
that can undermine both the legitimacy and efficacy of resulting
decisions. It recognizes that delegation to agents, though necessary
for large-scale administration, poses several categories of foreseeable
challenges.77
First is the danger that permitting undemocratic,
extraconstitutional decisionmakers to construe the law unfettered by
precise statutory mandate will foster arbitrary or unreflective
governance. The absence of any constraint on the exercise of power
poses a particular problem in light of fundamental rule-of-law values,
78
which require rationality and regularity in legal application.
Second, broad discretion creates the possibility that the exercise
of power will respond to private, rather than public, priorities. The
concern over taint by private interests takes several forms. Most

75. Id. (“Vague, general, or ambiguous statutes create discretion and threaten the
legitimacy of agency action under the ‘transmission belt’ theory of administrative law.”); see also
id. at 1677 (“[F]ederal legislation establishing agency charters has, over the past several decades,
often been strikingly broad and nonspecific, and has accordingly generated the very conditions
which the traditional model was designed to eliminate.” (citations omitted)).
76. Id. at 1672–76.
77. There is, of course, a vigorous literature setting forth fundamental constitutional and
policy arguments against the legitimacy of delegation—especially broad delegation—to
unelected agencies in the first place. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 133 (1980) (“That legislators often find it convenient to escape
accountability is precisely the reason for a non-delegation doctrine.”); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE
END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 127 (1969)
(“[Delegation] becomes pathological, and criticizable, at the point where it comes to be
considered a good thing in itself, flowing to administrators without guides, checks, safeguards.”).
78. See generally A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 120 (8th ed. 1982) (stating that rule of law requires, “in the first place, the
absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary
power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even wide discretionary
authority on the part of the government”).
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simply, particular decisionmakers (whether individual bureaucrats or
79
agencies as a whole) may seek to aggrandize their own power,
minimize their effort level, or favor personal policy predilections over
those of Congress. More generally, the process of administrative
decisionmaking itself may be captured by interested private factions.80
Courts have identified a third type of danger when administrative
discretion is delegated to private parties rather than to public
regulators: the decisionmaker may be both self-aggrandizing and selfinterested.81
Finally, because its exercise often need not be justified, wide
managerial discretion may render careful explanation by
decisionmakers unnecessary, thus obscuring the reasons underlying
particular decisions. In this way, broad leeway can imperil the ability
of democratic or constitutional institutions like the public, Congress,
and the courts to oversee agencies and review their decisions.82
Thus, discretion in the interpretation and implementation of
regulatory directives may compromise three related governance
values: rationality in choosing between solutions; responsiveness to
public interests; and reviewability by others. These shortcomings
jeopardize both the effective pursuit of legislative goals, and public
law norms about decisionmaking in the exercise and implementation
of government power.

79. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 915, 917 (2005) (“[The] pervasive assumption in constitutional law and theory is that
government officials are empire-builders, imperialistically or avariciously intent upon
maximizing the power or wealth of their offices and institutions.”).
80. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039 (1997) (discussing the development of “capture theory,” which depicted
administrative agencies as the captives of big business); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1565 (1992) (“According to the
capture hypothesis, instead of providing meaningful input into deliberation about the public
interest, industry representatives co-opt governmental regulatory power in order to satisfy their
private desires.”); Stewart, supra note 71, at 1684–86 (describing how administrative agencies
are captured by the interests they are charged to regulate).
81. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (rooting the proscription on
delegation to private parties in the concern over self-interested regulation); Sierra Club v.
Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 962 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (observing that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
hiring a private consulting firm was particularly troubling when the private firm essentially
prepared the environmental impact statement for a project in which it had a stake).
82. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Agencies must articulate a satisfactory explanation for their action to permit effective judicial
review.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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2. Administrative Law and the Accountability Paradigm.
Modern administrative law seeks methods beyond control to
safeguard against the dangers of broad delegation. Specifically, it
seeks to channel the exercise of discretionary authority by making
administrative decisionmaking “accountable.” Although different
scholars employ that term more or less broadly,83 this Article follows
the path of those who understand accountability generally as “checks
84
on decision making” intended to channel discretion so as to promote
both effective and legitimate regulatory decisions.
More specifically, the accountability model seeks to overcome
uncertainty about changing circumstances or precise substantive
results by other means. As to the question “accountable for what?”
administrative law supplements incomplete demands for specific
solutions with requirements that decisions be made consonant with
rule-of-law and sound decisionmaking notions of deliberation,
thoroughness and consistency. As to the question “accountable to
what ends?” it emphasizes the touchstone of public norms, however
general, articulated by Congress. And regarding “accountable to
whom?” the administrative process involves multiple players,
including Congress, the courts, the executive, and a variety of private
actors, making clear that administrative decisions must be made in a
way that both results and decision processes themselves can be
reviewed from the outside.
Throughout, the accountability model recognizes that
discretionary decisionmaking is complicated. It implicitly rejects a
simplified rational actor model of agency behavior, and is informed
not only by legal theory and policy, but also increasingly by political
science and economic understandings of how institutions and the
individuals within them make decisions in the political arena.

83. Compare Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003) (distinguishing political accountability
to democratic branches of government from other values like rational policymaking), with
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1700 (2002) (noting that approaches to accountability dominating by
economic values often do not adequately take noneconomic values into account), and Marshall
J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 423, 423
(1996) (identifying various types of accountability in addition to “[a]ccountability [t]hrough
[d]irect [d]emocracy”). See generally Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the AntiAdministrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005) (rejecting notions that electoral control
and decisionmaking devolution actually constitute “accountability,” and promoting
administrative hierarchy as necessary for accountability).
84. Freeman, Private Role, supra note 12, at 664.
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Based on these understandings of bureaucratic behavior,
administrative law regulates decisionmaking, in large part through
structural design. It ensures that a variety of government and private
actors, each with their own interests, capacities, and approaches to
problems, have particular roles in the discussion. Directly elected
legislators set goals guided by political calculus. Private parties
represent a host of divergent interests through participatory
procedures. Agencies guided by substantive expertise and informed
by executive policies promulgate regulations. Independent judges,
guided by precedent and legal principle, review the resulting
determinations. Through the administrative structure, multiple
participants—each armed with a different decisionmaking logic—
participate in the process that leads to a final agency decision.
This external structure shapes internal agency decisionmaking.
Formal participation processes govern the procedures by which
agencies gather knowledge. The Administrative Procedure Act
85
(APA) itself requires consideration of divergent perspectives in a
86
number of ways. Its notice-and-comment provisions, for example,
compel agencies promulgating rules to account for a written record
filled with information and interpretations from a host of conflicting
viewpoints.87 By legislation and executive order, Congress and the
President further compel agencies to consider information they might
not ordinarily address, such as the impact on the environment,88 state

85. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
86. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79 nn.226–27 (1998) (noting that the APA facilitates deliberative
agency decisions); Stewart, supra note 71, at 1670 (noting that APA procedures are “designed to
promote the accuracy, rationality, and reviewability of agency application of legislative
directives”).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000) (setting forth notice and comment requirements for
administrative rulemaking). See generally Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741
(1996) (“[N]otice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act [are] designed
to assure due deliberation.”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference
to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 660–62 (1996) (arguing that
APA procedural safeguards promote fair and informed administrative decisionmaking).
88. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–
(v) (2000), for example, mandated that agencies prepare Environmental Impact Statements. By
explicitly instructing agencies to consider types of information not previously taken into
account, NEPA changed decision outcomes by “making bureaucracies think.” SERGE TAYLOR,
MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 3–4 (1984).
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89
90
and local governments and small business, as well as the costs and
91
benefits of regulatory decisions.
Judicial standards further shape the decision process. Under both
the APA’s proscription against “arbitrary and capricious” agency
92
93
action and Chevron’s step-two reasonableness requirement, courts
require that agencies engage in reasoned deliberation in reaching
94
their decisions. Specifically, they require that agencies take account
of all of the information in the record and explain, in a public way,
why they reached their outcome in light of contrary data, arguments,
and alternatives presented.95 Through such requirements, “all of the
intensity of [judicial] review is directed toward identifying flaws in the
96
agency’s decisional process.”
Finally, the transparent nature of administrative record building
and agency decisionmaking further facilitates accountability in a host

89. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 § 2, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000).
90. Regulatory Flexibility Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. 603(a) (2000).
91. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000)
(“In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.”).
92. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41
(1983) (holding that the APA’s proscription against arbitrary and capricious decision making
requires reasoned decision making); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 415–17 (1971) (same).
93. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 457–59 (2002) (discussing APA/Chevron parallels);
Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1253, 1263–66 (1997) (discussing lower court cases interpreting Chevron’s step-two
“reasonableness” requirement to parallel APA cases requirement and thereby hold that an
interpretation is not “reasonable” unless well explained).
94. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating
that agency action is arbitrary and capricious when “the agency has not really taken a ‘hard
look’ at the salient problems and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making”
(footnote omitted)).
95. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 315 (1996) (“Well-settled principles of
administrative review plainly require agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their legal
interpretations . . . .”); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 518 (2002) (“On its face, arbitrary and
capricious review, as currently implemented under the “hard-look” or “relevant factors” rubric,
is almost entirely a process-based evaluation. It does not compare the outcome to some ideal
that the judge has in mind, and eschews inquiring whether the agency decision, in fact, turned
out to be wise. It essentially asks the agency to explain why it reached the outcome it did in light
of data available to the agency, alternatives to the outcome, and arguments presented to the
agency by those whom the rule will affect.” (footnotes omitted)).
96. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 589 (2002).
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of ways. These processes make agency explanations available to
Congress, which can evaluate the agency’s implementation of
legislative goals and formulate legislative responses. As discussed
previously, they allow courts to assess agency decisionmaking without
necessarily intruding on the substance of decision outcomes. And
they provide both private groups and other government institutions
with meaningful yardsticks for reviewing, assessing, and critiquing
ultimate agency action.97
The accountability paradigm, then, relies on the involvement of
multiple actors and methods in the search for regulatory solutions.
These actors bring to bear varied institutional capacities and decisionprocess strengths on regulatory choices. In this model, static notions
of control are supplemented—and often supplanted—by learning,
dialogue, process, and accountability.
3. Administrative Accountability as a Model for Structuring
Regulatory Delegation. The administrative accountability model
provides a useful model for addressing similar problems arising from
the delegation of decisionmaking to regulated firms. It first suggests
that when delegations involve complex issues and require the exercise
of significant discretion by agents, traditional methods for controlling
behavior may prove ineffective at promoting solutions consonant with
legislative goals and public norms.
Second, it suggests that additional measures intended to channel
discretion must be informed by an understanding of the challenges to
good decisionmaking particular to the context.
Third, it emphasizes the participation of a variety of actors in the
decision process, each animated by different institutional concerns
and approaches to decisionmaking. In particular, it highlights the role
of external information inputs and outside influences on internal
processes in promoting rational, responsive, and reviewable decisions.
Finally, it suggests that focusing on those processes, rather than
just on substantive outcomes, provides one measure by which
external parties can assess the administrative exercise of discretion
without losing the benefits of delegation by reexamining every agency
decision de novo. This approach, in turn, makes a certain level of
decisional transparency essential to permitting meaningful review. In
97. See Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 97 (Winter 1994) (discussing Congress’s direct “police-patrol”
monitoring, and indirect “fire-alarm” oversight in which informed third-parties provide signals).
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such a framework, accountability provides a means for promoting
good decisionmaking when commands and controls are not enough.
The subsequent two parts of this Article seek to explore the ways
in which an accountability paradigm might be applied to regulatory
delegations. Drawing on the paradigm’s recognition of the complexity
inherent in political and agency decisionmaking, Part II develops a
detailed account of decisionmaking in regulated firms, with particular
emphasis on the ways in which firms’ efficient organization can create
tensions with the effective pursuit of public goals. So informed, Part
III then applies the remaining lessons of the administrative law
model, suggesting a framework for regulating private firm
decisionmaking in a way that promotes accountability.
II. LEARNING FROM THE LITERATURE ON BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS—HOW DELEGATION TO REGULATED FIRMS
CREATES ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEMS
The dominant models for controlling regulated firm behavior—
bottom-up normative commitments and top-down government
control—share two characteristics. First, they envision firms as
unitary decisionmakers, treating whole organizations as single legal
actors. Second, the dominant models focus on shaping the
preferences of atomistic corporations, which presupposes that firms
can achieve regulatory goals in a purposive and rational manner.
By collapsing firms and their constituent members into unitary
actors, these models neglect the importance of each. For in reality
“firm” behavior is a product of both the interaction of numerous
individuals within a company and the complex effect of particular
organizational context in shaping those individuals’ behaviors.
Recent corporate law scholarship drawing on insights in the
management and organizational behavior literatures emphasizes that
corporate decisionmaking cannot be understood by a monolithic
template of organizational rationality. Rather, it is dependent on
98
relations among individual actors within firms. Pathbreaking

98. For diverse examples of this wide-ranging scholarship, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why
A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 41 (2002)
(“Concerns about groupthink, social loafing, and collective action failures, however, all prove
relevant to operationalizing group decisionmaking in the corporate setting.”); Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 264 (1999)
(“[S]ome kinds of outcomes can only be achieved through joint effort—sometimes the joint
effort of large numbers of people.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the
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literature in behavioral law and economics has further dismantled the
building blocks underlying models of rational firm behavior,
exploring the predictable failures of rationality in individual
99
decisionmaking and cognition. And the broader social science
research on which these approaches draw reveals that organizational
dynamics arising from individual cognition and relationships mold
firm behavior at least as much as—and often in ways that subvert—
the purposive pursuit of institutional goals.
Because administrative law has enlisted private firms in
regulatory decisions, it must learn the lessons of those who study
private firm decisionmaking by opening the “black box” of the firm to
examine the decision systems within. This Part accordingly discusses
the pertinent literature on organizational behavior, and considers its
implications for the capacity of firms to implement regulation
consistent with public norms. It then considers the ways in which
predictable behavioral pathologies can undermine firms’ capacities to
make regulatory decisions in a manner that effectively furthers
regulatory ends. In other words, efficient firm organization can itself
make firm decisionmaking unaccountable.
A. How Firms Organize Decisionmaking Around Efficiency
1. Overcoming Limits of Individual Cognition. Firms are
comprised of individuals. When regulation entrusts firms with
pursuing legal ends, it relies on their ability to coordinate those
individuals successfully. This organizational challenge would be
formidable even if all members of the firm conformed to the ideal of

Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (2003) (“There
are many fascinating angles to an inquiry into whether corporate agents have an affirmative
duty to disclose information to their superiors . . . .”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes,
CEOs, and Informational Monopolies, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1315–16 (2005) (“[T]he focus of
corporate law should be on the CEO and the entire senior management structure of the
corporation, examining the relationship of that structure to the board’s ability to perform.”);
Symposium, Corporate Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers: Perspectives from Law and Social
Psychology, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (2005). This turn in scholarship was pioneered by John C.
Coffee, Jr. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977) [hereinafter
Coffee, Shut-Eyed Sentry]; John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1980).
99. For an influential account of the behavioral influence in legal economics, see Christine
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1501–05
(1998). See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
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a fully rational actor. Even in rational choice models individuals
diverge in their preferences, and therefore in their assessments of
how to maximize utility. Thus, coordinating even fully rational
individuals requires aligning the economic interests and normative
goals of each with those of the firm so as to direct personal choices
toward organizational ends.
The management challenge is rendered even more complex,
however, by the ways in which humans actually make decisions.
Whereas rational choice theory models individuals with perfect (or at
least sufficient) information about their preferences and the
alternatives open to them, real individuals are at best “boundedly”
rational, constrained by the limits of both the human mind and
practicality.101 Biological constraints on perceptual and computational
capacity mean that real human decisionmakers can never hope to
process all available information about all possible choices, or predict
the implications of every decision. Moreover, a decisionmaker’s
limited attentional capability precludes focused consideration of
every alternative—a result exacerbated by the prohibitive cost in time
and other resources.102

100. Under a rational choice model, actors make decisions based both on complete
information about available alternatives, their implications, and on a full awareness of their
preferences, which are stable, identifiable and exogenous to—that is, they preexist—any
particular decision. By measuring alternatives against preferences, the rational person makes
choices that maximize utility.
101. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957) (“The capacity of the human mind
for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world . . . .”
(emphasis omitted)); see also KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 37 (1974)
(“[T]he scarcity of information-handling ability is an essential feature for the understanding of
both individual and organizational behavior.”); CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE
EXECUTIVE 305 (1968) (“Much of the error of historians, economists and all of us in daily
affairs arises from imputing logical reason to men who could not or cannot base their actions on
reason.”).
102. See David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Limited Attention, Information Disclosure,
and Financial Reporting 5–9 (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2002/
2002-5.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (reviewing the theory and evidence on limited attention
and information processing). The debate as to the precise limits of human computational
capacity and to the extent it might be affected by organizational and technological structures
falls beyond the scope of this paper. See Joseph Porac & Zur Shapira, On Mind, Environment,
and Simon’s Scissors of Rational Behavior, 5 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 206, 209–10 (2001)
(discussing psychological and neuroscientific research). Yet at a minimum, boundedly rational
individuals face constraints on the attention that can be paid to a variety of important factors,
including which tasks will attract their focus, which of any number of conflicting goals they will
consider in a given circumstance, and which possible paths will deserve more complete
consideration. See generally JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING (1994)
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Humans, therefore, must make decisions with only imperfect
information about available courses of action or their consequences,
conflicted understandings of underlying goals, and uncertainty as to
103
the relation between the three.
The human mind adapts to these shortcomings by developing
unconscious cognitive shortcuts that generally make it easier to make
sense of new situations even in the absence of complete information.
These “biases” or “heuristics” rely on unconscious cues from familiar
aspects of context: a single contextual element can prompt a
decisionmaker about the more general nature of an unfamiliar
setting, and therefore permit her to make efficient decisions even in
situations of uncertainty. Rather than “maximizing,” then, humans
104
consider only a few possible courses of action and “satisfice[],”
choosing to settle for a solution that is adequate.
The importance of situational cues for unconscious shortcuts in
human thinking reveals the extent to which decisions are wrought by
an environment humans do not control, rather than by purposive
choices. Legal sociologist Mark Suchman provides an example to
illustrate the ways in which even ostensibly rational choices are
shaped by unconscious cognitive processes. Imagine, he suggests,
“that one finds oneself confronted by a large bag of coins sitting in
the open door of an unattended armored car.”105 How does one
decide what to do? A consequentialist account—such as the
deterrence model—would emphasize “the mental calculus of
appraising the value of the coins, assessing the probability of
successfully appropriating them, and estimating the certainty and
severity of punishment.”106 A normative account, such as the goodapple paradigm, would accentuate the values that one applies once
one has appropriately identified the context as one in which the norm
should prevail.107

(discussing attentional limits); James G. March & Zur Shapira, Variable Risk Preferences and
the Focus of Attention, 99 PSYCH. REV. 172 (1992) (same).
103. The implications of these constraints pervade the decision process. Not only is the
decisionmaker uncertain about empirical facts, but he or she is uncertain about the logical
implications of those facts. See Roy Radner, Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the
Theory of the Firm, 106 ECON. J. 1360, 1367 (1996).
104. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxix (3d ed. 1976).
105. Suchman, supra note 58, at 483.
106. Id.
107. Id. “A normative account, too, would emphasize conscious mental reactions, but
instead of focusing on the weighing of costs and benefits, it would focus on one’s internal moral
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Yet a cognitive understanding of decisionmaking emphasizes
processes logically prior to the other two: the culturally-specific
108
process of construing the meaning of the ambiguous social reality
one encounters. As Professor Suchman further describes:
[C]ognitive models emphasize the choices that we make without
ever noticing. Often, certain lines of action simply seem obvious,
natural or necessary as part of “the way the world works.” Given
this, the most important determinants of decision-making may be
neither costs and benefits nor moral principles, but rather, the
taken-for-granted cultural categories, definitions and accounts that
109
help us to make sense of our lives.

Accordingly, the cognitive component of decisionmaking
addresses, in large part, how one identifies what information is
pertinent, interprets that information, and makes sense of those
interpretations. In the example of the armored car, assessments of
context (“What kind of situation is this?”), identity (“What kind of
person am I?”), and even role (“As guard/bank officer/bystander/
thief, is there a standard routine that I follow?”) would largely frame
one’s ultimate choice, and shape any subsequent purposive inquiry
into what norms should be invoked, or what consequences might
follow. These cognitive frames explain puzzles such as how
individuals committed to certain normative principles may, in context,
act contrary to those principles, or how they make decisions
inconsistent with their “self-interest.”
They also explain why, despite the fact that humans have only
limited information processing capacity, individuals frequently make
decisions leading to efficient outcomes. The behavioral literature
describes an adaptive process by which humans act according to
“rules,” or general shortcuts applicable across contexts, precluding
the need to consider anew the character, costs and benefits, and
110
implications of every given choice.
As the armored car scenario suggests, rules shape appropriate
behavior by defining identities, roles, and what is expected in certain

dialogue about the propriety of theft, the justificatory power of personal or familial need, and
the (im)morality of concentrated wealth.” Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 482.
110. JAMES G. MARCH, MARTIN SCHULZ & XUEGUANG ZHOU, THE DYNAMICS OF RULES:
CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL CODES 6 (2000).
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111
categories of situations. Thus, they provide preexisting patterns that
simplify decisionmaking by narrowing down an unlimited
combination of uncertain consequences and preferences to a threestep task. First they indicate, with respect to context, the appropriate
construction of the self: “Which of my identities is relevant?” Second,
they make sense of the reality: “How do I code the situation in which
I find myself?” Third, they construe the match between the two:
“What do my identities tell me to do in the situation as I have defined
it?”112
The ability of context to shape cognition suggests the role of
firms in promoting efficient decisionmaking. Firms provide a
particular organizational setting that shapes both the conscious and
unconscious rules of decision for individuals within them. In this
sense, firm organization can be understood, at least in part, as a
response to the constraints of individual cognition. Although any one
individual may lack the capacity to collect, possess and assess all of
the information and knowledge necessary for complex industrial
processes, such capacity can be harnessed by the coordination of
multiple boundedly rational actors,113 permitting the organization
itself to “choose” more “rationally.”
Coordinating tasks through formally rational structures permits
firms to augment, rather than just aggregate, the capacities of the
individual in a number of ways.114
Most simply, firms organize administratively in ways that limit
the attention and perception demands on any individual
decisionmaker. Employees are organized into discrete subunits, each
assigned a discrete set of tasks and subgoals, and charged with
mastery of a limited set of information. A maintenance worker in a
particular plant can focus on the immediate needs of machinery on

111. See id.
112. Id.
113. ARROW, supra note 101, at 37 (“[T]he value of nonmarket decision-making, the
desirability of creating organizations of a scope more limited than the market as a whole, is
partially determined by the characteristics of the network of information flows.”); Cristiano
Antonelli, The Governance of Technological Knowledge: Strategies, Processes and Public
Policies 6 (Univ. of Turin Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No. 6, 2003) (discussing the resourcebased theory of the firm consensus around the assumption that the generation of knowledge is
the distinctive feature of the firm).
114. The informational implications of organization, of course, track the more general
recognition that “people can produce more if they cooperate.” PAUL MILGROM & JOHN
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 25 (1992).
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the production floor without having to allocate attention to the
115
broader firm goal of profit maximization. An attorney in the general
counsel’s office can attend to contracts with particular suppliers
without diverting consideration to customer relations. And a
customer sales representative can focus on clients without worrying
about production processes. This distribution of decision
responsibility throughout the firm mitigates any individual
decisionmaker’s attention and perception constraints, while
permitting the organization as a whole to engage in the wide variety
of activities necessary in the modern corporation.
Similarly, firms mitigate constraints on individual perception and
attention through what scholars of social cognition in organizations
call “knowledge structures,” rules and procedures for making sense of
situations and identifying the appropriate response quickly. Such
structures provide shortcuts that enable individuals to identify the
type of challenge they face efficiently, focus their attention on the
kind of information needed for that sort of situation, and invoke an
applicable rule of behavior swiftly. These structures include formal
“top-down” rules, embodied in standard operating procedures,
handbooks, and organization charts.116 They also include “bottom-up”
rules developed on the ground through the evolution of informal
routines and rules of thumb.
Although the importance of top-down rules may be more selfevident, bottom-up routines promote efficiency in a variety of
important ways. First, they transform lessons learned from previous
decisions—successful and unsuccessful—into rules for identifying
117
similar situations quickly and providing a regularized response. By
storing firm knowledge in this way, routines eliminate the need to

115. See Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, supra note 7, at 451, 489–90
(discussing this division of responsibilities in the context of environmental regulation).
116. RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 134
(Blackwell Publishers 1992) (1963) (“These rules are the focus for control within the firm; they
are the result of a long-run adaptive process by which the firm learns; they are the short-run
focus for decision making within the organization.”).
117. James P. Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes from a Trip Down
Memory Lane, 6 ORG. SCI. 280, 281 (1995); see also Michael D. Cohen & Paul Bacdayan,
Organizational Routines Are Stored as Procedural Memory: Evidence from a Laboratory Study,
5 ORG. SCI. 554, 555 (1994) (“[Routines] store organizational experience in a form that allows
the organization to rapidly transfer that experience to new situations.”). See generally Markus C.
Becker, Organizational Routines: A Review of the Literature, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 643
(2004) (reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on routines).
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reinvent the wheel, and “allow reuse of solutions to problems.”
Second, the knowledge encoded in routines guides effective
decisionmaking in nonroutine situations. Because they convey more
nuanced information than formal top-down rules, routines are useful
in identifying familiar elements of ill-defined situations, thereby
providing behavioral cues for interpreting and solving ambiguous
problems.119 Third, learning from new experiences permits firm
routines to adapt incrementally to change based on continuous
environmental feedback. “Such experiential learning is often
adaptively rational. That is, it allows organizations to find good, even
optimal, rules for many choices they are likely to face.”120
2. Overcoming Environmental Uncertainty.
Organizational
structures further provide means for efficient decisionmaking in the
face of changing and uncertain situations outside the firm. No
organization is self-sufficient. To survive, firms require information
and resources from, and therefore must enter into exchanges with, the
external environment. A manufacturing firm, for example, requires
external information about customer demands, technological
advancements, and the behavior of competitors. It also looks to the
environment for inputs to production such as raw materials, labor,
and production processes and machinery, as well as for markets for
outputs. The more imperfect the information accessible to firms, the
greater the uncertainty in their environment.121 And the more firms
need external resources, the greater their dependence on the
122
environment.
But firms are not merely inactive bodies affected by external
forces. Rather, as a rich sociological literature (which has not
attracted much attention by legal scholars) describes, firms respond to
and influence their environments by organizing through rational and

118. MARCH, SCHULZ & ZHOU, supra note 110, at 186 (“[O]rganizations confront internal
and external problems, draw inferences from their experiences in those confrontations, and
encode the inferences in rules. Lessons encoded in rules represent knowledge about solutions to
problems found in the past. Rules retain knowledge and allow reuse of solutions to problems.”).
119. March, supra note 48, at 18 (stating that rules that suggest behavior in situations
according to the decisionmaker’s identity “may be developed through experience, learned from
others, or generalized from similar situations”).
120. Id.
121. J.D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 9 (1967).
122. See JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 51–52 (1978).
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123
efficient administrative and knowledge structures. This adaptivity
should, however, be of primary interest to regulators, because it
influences interactions with every aspect of the environment,
including regulation.
Specifically, organizations make purposive efforts to reduce
environmental uncertainty and dependence. They may make internal
changes such as adapting their information systems so as to reduce
uncertainty, diversifying technologies and processes so as to limit
dependence on particular resources, or altering their pattern of
management and human relations to better attract needed workers
and other relationships. As to the latter, for example, institutional
theorists emphasize that firms, through a process of “institutional
124
adopt structures and practices from other
isomorphism,”
organizations like competitors, unions, professions, and trade
125
associations that are considered “legitimate” and which therefore
attract environmental partners to work with them.126 Moreover,
organizations may also take steps to extend control over external
exchanges that are critical to their operations by altering the
environment through mergers,127 or by co-option128: attempting to
manage those exchanges through long-term relationships over which
they can exercise significant control. Thus, by a combination of
internal and external measures, organizations work to shape their
relations with the environment efficiently, by increasing control over
interorganizational exchanges and reducing the power of
environmental forces over the organization.
Firms, then, organize not only through internal structures and
rules intended to promote efficiency, but also by creating filters
through which complex environments can be understood and, in some
instances, controlled.

123. In sociological terms, environments not only act on particular organizations, they are
“enacted” by them. KARL E. WEICK, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING 63–71 (1969).
124. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150
(1983).
125. Id. at 152.
126. See W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer, The Organization of Societal Sectors, in
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALITY 129, 140 (John W. Meyer & W.
Richard Scott eds., 1983) (“Institutional sectors are characterized by the elaboration of rules and
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and
legitimacy from the environment.”).
127. See PFEFFER & SALANCIK, supra note 122, at 114–15.
128. Id. at 161–65.
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B. The Weaknesses of Efficient Organization: Accountability
Problems in Firm Decisionmaking
To this point, the account of decisionmaking in firms suggests
that the compliance paradigm’s model of firm behavior might need no
revision. If firms indeed successfully organize themselves to overcome
individual shortcomings and achieve complex firmwide goals
(including successful compliance with legal mandates) then perhaps
the traditional modes of regulatory control—using top-down
encouragement
and
incentives
to
encourage
bottom-up
implementation of legal mandates—requires little supplementation.
The firm’s sources of strength, however, are also its
129
weaknesses. Indeed, the same processes that coordinate individual
decisions efficiently in many circumstances can also create predictable
decisionmaking pathologies in others. These cognitively rooted
pathologies are particularly pronounced when decisions involve the
pursuit of an externally imposed goal (such as a regulatory norm) that
creates tension with other objectives (such as competitiveness or
profit making) around which efficient firms structure their focus.
Indeed, in the context of regulatory decisionmaking, these
pathologies can produce decisions that are both irrational and
contrary to the public norm. Moreover, because these pathologies
result from decision processes buried deep within firms, they are
virtually unreviewable. Accordingly, they pose a problem for the very
values about which administrative accountability is most concerned.
1. Decisionmaking Pathologies in Efficient Organizations. Part
II.A describes the role of organizational and knowledge structures in
streamlining decisionmaking within organizations. These structures
reflect choices about which factors deserve decisionmakers’ focus,
and which do not. These efficient arrangements themselves create
predictable decisionmaking pathologies. Specifically, they sometimes
foster decisions uninformed by pertinent information, and create
insensitivity to risk, in part because of adaptive responses that
camouflage important threats.

129. Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster, 25
ANN. REV. SOC. 271, 274 (1999) (“[T]he same characteristics of a system that produce the bright
side will regularly provoke the dark side from time to time.”).
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a. Uninformed Decisions. The specialization and division of
labor critical to efficient firm organization creates information
130
Top managers possess more (or
asymmetries intentionally.
exclusive) information about the firm’s broad goals, yet only
generalized knowledge about the activities of different subunits. By
contrast, employees working in subunits are ignorant of many firm
priorities and concerns, yet possess superior knowledge about a range
of issues, including production processes, customer interactions,
product market trends, and technological challenges.
This segmentation of knowledge, therefore, promotes efficiency
especially well with respect to ongoing operations that are central to
the achievement of recognized firm purposes. Pertinent information
about firm and subgroup goals must be communicated downward
from the few to the many, while localized knowledge must be
transferred upward, or horizontally across units. Yet deriving
efficiency from knowledge segmentation requires managers to
maximize necessary information flow while devoting the fewest
resources to it. This in turn favors systems geared to transmitting
types of information that are easily codifiable, arise repeatedly, and
relate to the firm’s or subgroup’s core mission.
Accordingly, downward communication works well when
managers can easily integrate information into common job
instructions,131 convey firm and subgroup priorities through repeated
behavior,132 and embed messages about those priorities in formal
incentive structures. Similarly, information is most amenable to
efficient upward communication when it is familiar to supervisors,
and can be easily filtered and edited, condensed and summarized.
Communication systems that prioritize efficiency, however, are
less effective in ensuring that information about unanticipated issues,
unfamiliar events and changing circumstances reaches appropriate
decisionmakers, or will be recognized as relevant even by those with
access to it. For the reasons discussed in Part II.A, for example,

130. RICHARD H. HALL, ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES 169
(8th ed. 2002) (“If the total rationale for all actions were known to all members, the potential
for chaos would be high, since communication overload would quickly occur.”).
131. See generally id. at 168–70 (discussing downward communication, including direct
orders, job descriptions, and formal performance feedback); DANIEL KATZ & ROBERT L.
KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 440–43 (2d ed. 1978) (same).
132. HALL, supra note 130, at 169–70 (discussing, among other things, “attempts to
indoctrinate subordinates into accepting and believing in the organization’s (or the subunit’s)
goals”).
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communication overload precludes charging lower level workers with
concern for such low-frequency but potentially high-risk matters.
Upward communication systems similarly obscure effective focus
on such issues. The attention of the recipient is directed—and
misdirected—both by the inherent skew of upward communication,
and by the judgment and interpretation of intermediaries. As to the
distortion of information, the technical language and classification
schemes utilized by an organization’s formal lines of communication
will shape the content of the transmission. These processes may not
permit accurate transmission of knowledge that is difficult to codify,
such as the “tacit” knowledge that is embedded in worker skills, work
133
routines, and shared understandings. This may prevent upper-level
managers relying on the product of those decisions from
understanding how they were reached, and risks that may have been
ignored.
As to the interpretation of intermediaries, predictable cognitive
and systemic processes will bias decisions as to what information is
passed along in the editing process. For a variety of reasons other
than guile, people are less likely to pass information up if it will be
harmful to themselves or their peers. Specifically, pursuant to the
theory of cognitive dissonance, recipients of information
unconsciously focus on and relay only the information that reinforces
their preexisting attitudes, while filtering out conflicting
134
information.
In this corporate version of the children’s game of “Telephone,”
then, serial decision makers receive partial understanding, especially
about the possibility of unexpected negative outcomes. This effect is
exacerbated in cases in which upward communications contain early
135
tentative warnings about risks; in such cases a busy upper-level
manager, in winnowing down information for attention and further

133. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, Authority in the Context of Distributed Knowledge 8
(Danish Research Unit for Indus. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 03-08, 2002); Nicolai J. Foss,
Firms and the Coordination of Knowledge: Some Austrian Insights 24–27 (Danish Research Unit
for Indus. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 98-19, 1998) (discussing tacit forms of knowledge); see
also MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4–20 (Anchor Books 1967) (1966) (describing
psychological experiments and various aspects of tacit knowledge).
134. See Coffee, Shut-Eyed Sentry, supra note 98, at 1137 (discussing the “problems
associated with the upward transmission of adverse information within the corporate
hierarchy”).
135. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 136.
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transmission, may focus on what are perceived as more immediate
problems.
This is not to say that firm communication only works in routine
contexts demanding rigid responses. Successful firms, of course,
effectively structure flexible systems to identify and respond to
changing circumstances like market pressures and customer market
demands. But it does indicate that efficient information structures
within firms are often ill suited for the effective pursuit of solutions to
the type of risks in which regulators are interested—especially if
identifying and handling those risks falls outside, or is in tension with,
core firm goals.
b. Risk Insensitivity. The mismatch between firm organization
and effective regulatory decisionmaking is exacerbated by the
knowledge structures on which firm efficiency is premised. Formally
rational routines can bias perceptions about the information that is
relevant to decisions. This weakness, ironically, arises from routines’
136
strengths: heuristic muscle and adaptability. Although heuristics
often promote good decisions, they sometimes render decisionmakers
insensitive to changes in context by: (1) diverting attention from
change; and (2) by masking risk through incremental adaptation
i. Diverting Attention from Risk and Change. Approaching a
situation with a decision framework in mind exacerbates the cognitive
tendency to emphasize the familiarity of the situation and to
downplay its ambiguous nature. As Walter Lippmann described in his
1922 tract on the gullibility of the human mind:
Anyone who has stood at the end of a railroad platform waiting for
a friend, will recall what queer people he mistook for him. The
shape of a hat, a slightly characteristic gait, evoked the vivid picture
in his mind’s eye. In sleep a tinkle may sound like the pealing of a
great bell; the distant stroke of a hammer like a thunderclap. For our
constellations of imagery will vibrate to a stimulus that is perhaps
but vaguely similar to some aspect of them. They may, in
137
hallucination, flood the whole consciousness.

136. See Dennis A. Gioia, Symbols, Scripts, and Sensemaking: Creating Meaning in the
Organizational Experience, in THE THINKING ORGANIZATION 49, 58–59 (Warren Bennis et al.
eds., 1986) (discussing how such structuring of information speeds problem solving by furnishing
a basis for evaluating the information, often in ambiguous circumstances).
137. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 115 (1922).
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When their thoughts are framed by a pervasive knowledge structure,
decisionmakers recognize familiar patterns and apply rules of thumb
138
they believe are appropriate for that familiar situation. This
description suggests several different perceptual pathologies that
infect the entire decisionmaking process.
First, existing routines can inaccurately shape the
characterization of new situations. Before decisionmakers even
consider a course of action, they draw on the stock of existing
organizational routines to frame their understanding of the situation
139
they face. The more familiar—or cognitively “available” —the past
experience, the easier it is to draw on it as a lens for understanding
140
new events, and the easier it is to assimilate into existing routines.
As discussed earlier, this availability heuristic is often very effective;
the ease of remembering a type of event is often good evidence of its
likelihood. Yet, because cognition accentuates familiarity and
deemphasizes difference, it masks changes in circumstance that might
make existing routines inappropriate. Indeed, the process of matching
existing routines with new circumstances is sometimes so haphazard
that leading organizational sociologists have described it as the
“garbage can model” of decisionmaking.141 This refers to the process
of rooting around in the garbage can of routines and applying the one
142
that is first pulled out.
Second, existing routines can inaccurately shape the type of
information that decisionmakers will seek out and consider. The
cultural script called to mind shapes the type of information that
decisionmakers believe is necessary to make a decision. This bias will
prompt them to seek information of the type that reinforces the

138. March, supra note 48, at 21.
139. The “availability heuristic,” is discussed in Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11–14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
140. Sociologist Carol Heimer further describes how the availability heuristic can distort
rules in the opposite direction: by incorporating lessons learned from rare but memorable
events. Heimer, supra note 16, at 7. This may create other sorts of inappropriate decisions, by
which routine situations are treated as disasters. See, e.g., Elizabeth Goodrick & Gerald R.
Salancik, Organizational Discretion in Responding to Institutional Practices: Hospitals and
Cesarean Births, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 5–26 (1996) (exploring the ways in which doctors’
decisions to perform birth by Cesarean section are driven by organizational standards of
procedure rather than standards of best practices).
141. Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 1 (1972).
142. Id.
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similarity of this situation with others, and draw attention away from
143
Thus, individuals
other data, such as indicia of difference.
unconsciously “make the problematic non-problematic”144 by
shielding themselves from information that may disprove the
applicability of preexisting categories to new situations, even if the
result is to misunderstand the situation and respond inappropriately.
The initial process of contextual interpretation is exacerbated by
two sets of decisionmaking biases demonstrated in the behavioral
literature on judgment and decisionmaking. The first stems from the
unconscious cognitive strategy “to construe information and events in
such a way as to confirm prior attitudes, beliefs, and impressions.”145
Such “cognitive conservatism” is bolstered once a course of action has
been commenced by a “commitment” effect, which biases subsequent
analysis toward information that confirms the initial interpretation.146
The second involves the “self-serving bias” by which the mind
naturally interprets ambiguous information in a manner favorable to
the perceiver.147 Although this cognitive effect offers benefits as a
means of reducing anxiety and permitting functioning, it can
subconsciously skew the perception of a situation to justify a self-

143. For discussions of predecisional distortions of information, see generally Aaron L.
Brownstein, Biased Predecision Processing, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 545 (2003); J. Edward Russo
et al., The Distortion of Information During Decisions, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 102 (1996) (reporting findings of predecision distortions).
144. Vaughan, supra note 129, at 280–81.
145. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 135 (citing SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR,
SOCIAL COGNITION 150 (2d ed. 1991); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 167 (1980); Charles G. Lord et al.,
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979)).
146. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 142 (discussing the role of commitment in
decisionmaking). For discussion of “commitment” or “confirmation” biases, see generally
Jürgen Beckmann & Julius Kuhl, Altering Information to Gain Action Control: Functional
Aspects of Human Information Processing in Decision Making, 18 J. RES. PERSONALITY 224
(1984); Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the
Illusion of Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REV. 395 (1978); Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, Beliefs and
Expectations as Causes of Judgmental Bias, in JUDGMENTAL FORECASTING 31 (George Wright
& Peter Ayton eds., 1987); Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action,
6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577 (1981).
147. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 144 (“The notion of self-serving inference is another
fundamental construct in social cognition.”). For other discussions of self-serving bias, see Linda
Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving
Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997); Jolls et al., supra note 99, at 1501–04; Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1172–73
(2003).
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interested spin, and permit the self-deception that the group interest
148
is “in full consistency with their personal goals.”
These effects, Professor Donald Langevoort suggests, are
important in answering the beguiling question of why public
corporations mislead stock market investors, given that this behavior
“simply delays the appreciation of the truth rather than avoids it
149
indefinitely” and is ultimately uncovered. The first part of the
answer arises from organizational response to the bounded rationality
of individual managers who ultimately make decisions within a firm.
An optimistic “can-do” outlook is a characteristic of an effective
workplace. Yet such a culture exacerbates a manager’s “tendency to
underestimate or rationalize risk,” by shaping the interpretation of
early, and still ambiguous, information.150 Once managers have
publicly committed to expressions of optimism, they are to some
extent cognitively locked in to the approach. Their optimistic
perceptions are entrenched by their commitment, and they interpret
and winnow new information consistent with their self-interest.
Accordingly, fewer danger signs will raise red flags.
Finally, routines combine with structural pathologies plaguing
upward communication to reproduce individual perceptual
151
distortions throughout an organization. As both firm knowledge
structures and individual cognitive biases are reproduced at each level
of hierarchy, “[t]his more subtle winnowing and revisionism is
repeated at each relay point, with predictable effects on the final
message.”152 By Professor Langevoort’s account, systemic skewing of
information can result “not only (or even so much) by conscious
distortion, but also by biased interpretation” up the communication
ladder.153
ii. Masking Risk Through Incremental Adaptation: The “Nut
Island Effect.”154 Firm routines, moreover, mask change by adapting
to it. While the evolution of rules to compensate for new challenges
148. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 144.
149. Id. at 106.
150. Id. at 141.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 133–35.
152. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 147–48.
153. Id. at 147.
154. Paul F. Levy, The Nut Island Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar. 2001, at 51. The following description of the Nut Island episode is taken entirely from this
article.
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and circumstances can be efficient, it can also have the effect of
moving the baseline measure of usual behavior, and obscuring the
means to gauge deviation from previous norms. Routinized
decisionmaking both veils the existence of risks, and promotes
decisions that, because they are guided by logic inappropriate to the
context, create additional risk.
The process by which Boston Harbor’s Nut Island sewage
treatment plant degraded water quality for decades illustrates the
ways in which formally rational organizational structures and routines
can promote substantively irrational decisions. The plant was
operated by a state agency subunit, and was staffed by a cohesive and
hardworking staff that had overcome inefficient internal disputes by
developing a culture emphasizing cooperation and teamwork. A
focused, tight-knit group that eliminated “‘squeaky wheels’”155 on
staff, they were, in the words of the state agency director, “every
156
manager’s dream team.”
Through conversations and budgetary decisions, management
conveyed a streamlined goal to the unit—keep the facility running
and on budget—and the team focused on the demanding task without
distraction. They developed standard operating procedures and “rules
157
of thumb,” to maintain plant operations at low cost.
Adapting to circumstances, the rules of thumb were modified as
the team learned from experience. As the pumps at the core of the
plant degraded, the Nut Islanders increased the amount of lubricant
used, which kept the machines operational. As they learned what
level of wastewater grit would choke the aeration tanks, they limited
plant inflows to a manageable level. When they observed that
particularly heavy inflows precluded full treatment of the material,
they made sure to treat the wastewater with chlorine to eliminate
remaining pathogens, and pipe it out to sea. And they developed
routines for adding alkali to tanks when sample readings indicated
unusually high acidity.
Over time, however, it turned out that these adaptive procedures
simply masked risk, rather that addressing it. The plant ultimately
released the oil used on the machines into the harbor. The lubrication
routine is a suspected cause of the high concentration of oil in harbor

155.
156.
157.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 58.
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sediment. It also diverted attention away from other solutions, such as
asking managers for extra maintenance funding. Reducing grit by
limiting wastewater inflows resulted in the diversion of other
untreated waste directly into the harbor. The diversions were not
recorded as plant overflows because they had never actually entered
the facility in the first place. By adding chlorine to prevent untreated
wastewater from ending up in the harbor, they released an
environmental contaminant that kills marine life and destroys fragile
shore ecosystems. And by controlling acidity with alkali, they never
had to deal with the underlying causes of the acid variances.
Throughout, busy upper management was reassured by Nut Island’s
“patina of efficiency,” and focused on “business that seemed more
158
pressing.”
c. Combining Pathologies. Professor Langevoort’s account of
noncompliance with securities disclosure requirements and the case
of the “Nut Island Effect” provide vivid examples of how structural
and perceptual pathologies work in tandem to distort firm
decisionmaking. The decisionmakers’ motivations were not unlawful.
Indeed, in the case of the Nut Islanders, their commitment was
particularly laudable. The organizational cultures reflected exactly
the traits—focus, cohesion, cooperation—that can promote an
effective workplace. The work and reporting routines were formally
rational in light of subgroup tasks, and embodied organizational
learning. Yet the organizations’ knowledge structures prevented
decisionmakers from recognizing signs of risk and danger by
assimilating them into preexisting beliefs and familiar frameworks.
The prevailing cultures inhibited communication upward by those in
the best position to question standard operating procedures. And
structural secrecy permitted monitors to filter out troubling indicators
and rely only on positive signals that conformed to existing
perceptions.
2. Efficient Firm Decisionmaking and Accountability Problems
in the Exercise of Regulatory Discretion. Such decisionmaking
pathologies go to the heart of the effective exercise of regulatory
discretion. By this account, decisions are not only unresponsive to the
public goals delegated to the firm, but can be literally arbitrary, in

158.

Id. at 59.
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that they are reached because of unconscious and systemic factors
that neither firm managers nor individual decisionmakers intend to
matter. Moreover, the pathological processes responsible for these
irrational decisions, to a large extent, evade external review. The
flawed logic on which they rest are hidden in systems and in
instinctive responses that appear to be rationally ordered, but are
difficult to communicate and hard to monitor. When affected by
structural decisionmaking pathologies, then, firms’ exercise of
regulatory discretion threatens each element of decisionmaking
accountability.
a. Failures of Rationality. Predictable firm decisionmaking
pathologies suggest the ways in which traditional models of control
will fail in promoting the rational exercise of regulatory discretion.
Rules developed in prior contexts guide behavior in new situations
for which they may be inappropriate; relevant information is ignored
in favor of familiar but unimportant guideposts; the knowledge
necessary for informed judgment may be trapped so that it never
reaches the appropriate decisionmaker; and the vigorous and
purposeful pursuit of reasonable ends may subvert ultimate goals.
These pathologies, moreover, impede judgment most predictably
when the matter at issue is the type of greatest concern to regulation:
the accurate assessment of the type of risk and change not only likely
to affect an individual subunit or even a single firm, but to impose
costly externalities on product or capital markets or threaten health
and safety more broadly.
These sorts of decisionmaking pathologies indicate, at least, that
reliance on bottom-up commitment by firms for vigorous pursuit of
regulatory ends will undermine the type of rational decisions for
which administrative law holds delegated decisionmakers
accountable. Some firm decisions will predictably, in the words of the
Supreme Court, have “relied on factors which Congress [or agencies]
ha[ve] not intended,” have “entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem [or] offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence,” or be “so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of [decisionmaker]
expertise.”159 In other words, the exercise of regulated firm discretion,
by this account, will literally be arbitrary—reached “without
159. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(defining the standard for arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking).
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consideration or adjustment with reference to principles,
160
circumstances, or significance . . . [and] decisive but unreasoned” —
or capricious: simply “freakish.”161
Yet this account also signals the insufficiency of existing topdown models of control. The behavioral account of firm
decisionmaking indicates that the arbitrary exercise of regulatory
discretion may be particularly resistant to control tools rooted in
rational models. Indeed, the irrational decisions which trigger
accountability concerns in this context arise specifically from
purposive and adaptive processes geared to promoting coherent and
efficient outcomes. The individuals structuring and participating in
pathological decision processes often already believe that their
behavior is rational, and that they are pursuing compliance with legal
norms appropriately. In the words of one former CFO brought in to
help restructure a company after it had been convicted for financial
fraud, “no one ever thinks they work at a company where bad things
happen.”162 In that case, a regime that relies principally on incentives
to prevent “bad things” from happening will be stunted by the
inaccurate cognitive frames of decisionmakers who erroneously
believe that the desired result has already been achieved.
b. Failures of Responsiveness. The behavioral model of firm
decisionmaking, however, suggests more than arbitrariness in the
firm’s internal pursuit of regulatory goals. It also, in two distinct ways,
reveals particular systemic resistance to the exercise of judgment in a
way that is accountable to externally generated regulatory goals.
First, the structures and routines that guide behavior within firm
boundaries provide an interpretive lens through which external
environmental forces, such as government regulation, are translated
inside the firm. Specifically, the mechanisms that permit the
successful and efficient focus on internally generated firm goals also
adapt external directives so as to minimize conflict with existing
routines and practices. Second, firms project their internal way of
looking at things, and the cognitive shortcomings reflected therein, to
other parties with whom they interact, including the actors entrusted

160. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 244 n.14 (1946) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1945)).
161. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1945)).
162. Telephone interview with Steve Tisdell, President, The Compliance Partners, in
Nashville, Tenn. (Sept. 27, 2004).

01__BAMBERGER.DOC

428

12/19/2006 5:06 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:377

with the responsibility for oversight and accountability. In
combination, this double distortion of regulatory imperatives raises
concerns about regulated firms’ responsiveness to public goals.
i. Routines and the Distortion of External Regulatory Mandates
inside Firm Boundaries. As described above,163 firms shape relations
with other organizations in order to secure resources they need.
When these relationships are initiated because of particularized
requirements identified in a “bottom-up” way by the firm itself (such
as the need for supplies, know-how, or customers), the sensitivity to
environmental factors develops in a way that is both integrated into
the firm’s existing decision processes and reflects localized firm
knowledge, culture, and goals.
In contrast, the integration of externally developed regulatory
164
goals into existing firm routines poses greater challenges, for
“[al]though adoption of new structures and practices may smooth
interactions across organizational boundaries, it may be disruptive to
the internal workings of the organization.”165 Regulatory aims often
create tension with the corporate goals around which formally
rational structures and routines have developed. For example, the
aims on which efficient firm organization focuses will likely include
competitiveness, cohesion, and growth, rather than the particularities
of a regulatory regime. As a result, the established routines and
mindsets within the firm will prompt decisionmakers to adapt
external mandates in ways that most easily achieve the appearance of
legitimacy, while minimizing the dislocation of existing practices. In
this circumstance, the organizational capacity to reshape external
rules to minimize disruption of established routines will undermine
the efficacy of the regulation, rather than incorporate its norms.
In the language of organizational theory, the basic “resource”
that firms seek from regulatory compliance is the ability to signal to

163. See supra text accompanying notes 121–26.
164. Institutional sociologists describe the process of assimilating procedures that have
proven successful in similar organizations as “institutional isomorphism.” DiMaggio & Powell,
supra note 124, at 149–50. Such external structures, when imported to a new context, may not
provide the best local fit. The divergence between local fit and borrowed institutional forms is
particularly pronounced when the rules in question result from “coercive isomorphism,” such as
the imposition of legal rules by a regulator. Id. at 150–51.
165. Carol A. Heimer, Explaining Variation in the Impact of Law: Organizations,
Institutions, and Professions, in 15 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 29, 41 (Austin
Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1995).
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others outside the organization (including government enforcers,
business partners, and the market) that their pursuit of organizational
goals is valid. Accordingly, they incorporate certain visible indicators
of legitimacy. Such a process often results in the “ceremonial”
166
adoption of rules. Regulated firms incorporate structures that
appear to prioritize the concerns of the law, but really change little
about other activities in the organization. In the employment law
context, for example, legal sociologists have illustrated how firms
implement antidiscrimination protections by focusing compliance
efforts on creating new legalistic processes. Such procedures signal
“legality” but, because they are distinct from other firm structures,
avoid fundamental alterations in existing workplace culture. The legal
norm is therefore translated into the firm so that the “right to a
nondiscriminatory workplace in effect becomes a ‘right’ to complaint
resolution.”167 The right to complaint resolution, notes one sociologist,
“is far more superficial and entails fewer disruptions of routines than
168
would a right to a nondiscriminatory workplace.”
A similar process can be seen in the traditional focus on audits as
a central means for compliance with securities regulation. While there
is no doubt that such safeguards comprise an important component of
comporting with legal requirements, the capacity of audits is
necessarily limited. They explicitly focus on certain factors that can be
measured, such as whether data is presented in a universally
recognized manner, rather than on substantive changes to firm
169
practices. Thus, the establishment of auditable controls often
provides firms with ways to signal legitimacy without addressing
deeper problems inherent in existing routines and structures.

166. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as
Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340–41 (1977).
167. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil
Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 529 (1993); see also Lauren B. Edelman et
al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedure as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J.
SOC. 406 (1999) (discussing how organizations “construct rational responses to law, enabled by
‘rational myths’ . . . that are themselves modeled after the public legal order”).
168. Heimer, supra note 165, at 41.
169. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 269–70 (2004) (discussing how audits focus on
measures that can be tested, rather than on those that are effective). See generally MICHAEL
POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997) (tracing the explosion in
auditing activity since the 1980s in the United Kingdom and North America to political
demands for accountability and control).
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The failure of externally derived regulatory goals to fully affect
the decisions within the firm results in large part from the structural
and perceptual pathologies within the firm. The ability of regulatory
goals to reshape existing routines is significantly diminished if the
implementation is assigned to a subunit that has only limited power.
When legal rules remain one of a number of distinct and competing
claims on decisionmakers, their effect is haphazard. Because their
legitimacy is undermined, “it may be very difficult to produce
decisions that generally seem as justifiable and capable of
170
enforcement.”
ii. Extending Internal Pathologies outside Firm Boundaries.
Organizational structures do not simply provide the filter through
which organizations interpret their environments. They can also
extend pathologies of firm decisionmaking across organizational
boundaries. Professor Langevoort’s thick description of corporate
decisionmaking describes how organizational culture and the
resulting perceptual filters can both lead to decisions to misrepresent
information, and prevent discovery of distortions (whether purposeful
or unconscious) before securities misrepresentations occur. This
phenomenon, however, is further reflected by notable failures of the
third-party gatekeepers and intermediaries on whom the system relies
to keep corporations accountable.171 Indeed, in the words of the
Senate Committee Report investigating the Enron failure:
[W]hat Committee staff discovered was deeply disturbing—not so
much because they uncovered malfeasance or intentional
wrongdoing on anyone’s part (although that seems to have been
present in some cases as well), but because what emerged was a
story of systemic and arguably catastrophic failure, a failure of all

170. Martha S. Feldman & Alan J. Levy, Effects of Legal Context on Decision Making
Under Ambiguity, in THE LEGALISTIC ORGANIZATION 109, 113 (Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies
eds., 1994).
171. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2004) (suggesting an “explanation for
the wave of accounting and financial reporting irregularities that surfaced in 2001–2002: namely,
that the gatekeepers failed. That is, the professionals who serve investors by preparing,
verifying, or certifying corporate disclosures to the securities markets acquiesced in managerial
fraud . . . .”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1404–05 (2002) (arguing that the importance of the Enron debacle “lies [in] the
market’s discovery that it cannot rely upon the professional gatekeepers—auditors, analysts,
and others—whom the market has long trusted to filter, verify and assess complicated financial
information”).
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the watchdogs to properly discharge their appointed roles. Despite
the magnitude of Enron’s implosion and the apparent pervasiveness
of its fraudulent conduct, virtually no one in the multilayered system
of controls devised to protect the public detected Enron’s problems,
172
or, if they did, they did nothing to correct them or alert investors.

Some of this failure may be attributed to the incentive structures
and resulting conflicts of interest that shaped the behavior of thirdparty monitors. Yet research suggests that behavioral effects played a
significant role as well. In particular, the bias toward self-serving
interpretations of ambiguous data, which has been well documented
in outside auditor practice,173 can facilitate the transmission of
inaccurate information outside the bounds of the corporation. The
increased willingness of individuals to endorse biased proposals made
by others might also reinforce the information distortions coming out
of the regulated firm.174 Finally, the importance that accounting firms
place on understanding regulated firm culture, and the closeness with
which outside auditors work with teams internal to the corporation,
create the danger that those auditors will be subject to groupthink
175
judgment dynamics as well.
The failure of securities analysts to serve as corporate
malfeasance watchdogs may, at least in part, be attributable to a
similar phenomenon. Certainly, economic motives may underlie the
practice. Securities analysts may give false or misleading favorable

172. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 2.
173. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 168–70 (2000); Robert A. Prentice, The SEC
and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597,
1629–53 (2000).
174. See Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence:
Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling 17–18 (Am. Accounting Ass’n, Working Paper No.
03-115, 2004) (discussing the phenomenon, and concluding that “[t]he current system, in which
auditors are charged only with assessing whether or not the client’s reports comply with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, is likely to exploit the tendency to ‘go along’ with
the actions of another even when that action raises some questions or concerns”).
175. David B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who’s the Boss?: Controlling Auditor Incentives
Through Random Selection, 53 EMORY L.J. 391, 404–05 (2004) (“[A]uditors are subject to many
of the same cognitive biases that plague all people, and many of those biases work in favor of
complicity with management.”); see also PriceWaterhouseCoopers Recruiting Website,
http://www.pwcglobal.com/us/eng/careers/car-inexp/opportunities_mcs_career.html (last visited
Oct. 28, 2006) (“You’ll work as part of a team at the client’s office—often for months at a
time—side-by-side with the client’s staff. . . . Being on site also enables you to experience each
client’s culture firsthand, which in turn helps us create the most appropriate solution for each
situation.”).
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evaluations of corporate securities in order to attract or retain the
issuing corporations as investment banking clients. Yet research
demonstrates an even stronger correlation between optimistic
earnings and price forecasts and the length of time an analyst has
covered a stock. A study of over 4,500 analysts determined that
analysts at firms with underwriting and trading businesses are actually
less optimistic than those at pure brokerage houses, which perform no
underwriting.176 In contrast, “forecasts are more optimistic for analysts
with more experience covering a stock, suggesting that over time,
analysts develop relations with management that makes it difficult to
be independent.”177 Thus, the watchdog failures may have been less
attributable to economic conflicts of interests, than to shared social
178
cognition.
In sum, the structures and routines within firms both distort
regulatory goals within the firm, and extend such distortions outside
the firm. This phenomenon poses systemic barriers to a firm’s
responsiveness to regulatory goals.
c. Failures of Reviewability. Finally, the importance of routines
and cognitive filters in firm decisionmaking points to a failure of
reviewability. Because the routines that structure much firm behavior
are often unwritten, unarticulated, and even unconscious, they are
largely insulated from external review by administrative agencies, the
courts, or the public. External observers unfamiliar with internal
company workings lack the means to delve beyond formally rational
structures. They may be able to identify the existence of efficient firm

176. See Paul Healy et al., Which Types of Analyst Firms Make More Optimistic Forecasts? 1
(Regulatory Policy Program at the Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t,
Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. RPP-2004-08, 2004).
177. Id. at 6.
178. In her discussion of how what she refers to as “groupthink” hindered the independent
judgment of the Enron Board of Directors, Marleen O’Connor describes a similar extension of
firm knowledge structures across watchdog lines within the firm itself. The U.S. Senate and
special committee reports investigating Enron’s collapse revealed that its directors “were as
surprised as anyone by the company’s collapse,” because, through pathological decisionmaking
within the firm, the Board “felt swept along in disregarding warning signs and believing
irrational predictions.” Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71
U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1240–41 (2003).
This conclusion provides an added dimension to the infamous comment of Salomon
Smith Barney analyst Jack Grubman—celebrated for his close ties to corporate managers—that
“what used to be a conflict is now a synergy.” ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE TROUGH:
HOW CORPORATE GREED AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA 161
(2003).

01__BAMBERGER.DOC

2006]

12/19/2006 5:06 PM

REGULATION AS DELEGATION

433

organization, but they lack the logic to assess when formal structures
might lead to pathological outcomes, or to identify such structures
buried deep within the firm. Given these restraints, little is revealed
about whether a firm’s discretion will ultimately be exercised in a
179
responsive manner.
The inability of administrative agencies to review firm decisions
meaningfully, in particular, can foster patterns of agency-firm
interactions that threaten to eliminate the benefits of enlisting firms
as partners in regulation in the first place. Specifically, agencies and
firms can settle on a shared construction of externally verifiable ways
to satisfy regulatory dictates; these shared understandings, ironically,
may simply reproduce the very type of unthinking compliance
behavior that regulatory delegation was intended to replace.
When accorded discretion to implement legal mandates,
regulated firms reasonably seek and expect reliable guidance from
180
regulators. In the information security context, for example, private

179. Indeed, attempts to monitor strictly the exercise of discretion can actually exacerbate
the decisionmaking pathologies they seek to uncover. The literature on cognition demonstrates
that individuals who already have an internally generated propensity to obey the law (a “duty
heuristic”) will unconsciously overestimate the probability of detection, and therefore perceive
legal compliance to be in their self-interest. See John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear and
Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 491
(1995). Yet that research also demonstrates that such “internal motivation” can be “crowded
out” by a system that relies only on external motivation, see, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen,
Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589, 591–96 (2001), such as aggressive
monitoring, see Langevoort, supra note 61, at 96, or threat of punishment. Specifically,
crowding-out can diminish the sense of responsibility for decisions implementing regulation,
reduce the inclination to share relevant private information with other decisionmakers, and
impede identification with the legal goal. See Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Motivation,
Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Form 10–12 (Institute for Empirical Research in
Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 27, 1999). More generally, antagonistic
methods for guiding firm behavior tend to “make every interaction a contest of wills,
encouraging defiance and resistance among even those people who are not initially inclined to
defy or resist.” Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law-Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 371 (2001); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION 49–50 (1995) (examining empirical evidence suggesting that level of
punishment is inversely related to level of law-abiding behavior). Rather than encourage the
accountable exercise of judgment, such approaches threaten contrary results.
180. See, e.g., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
ACCOUNTANT, DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL
CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN EXCHANGE
ACT PERIODIC REPORTS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (revised Oct. 6, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/controlfaq1004.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (answering
“frequently asked questions” about the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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181
firms are “hungry for a streamlined compliance blueprint.” Such
appetite is neither surprising nor inherently problematic. Indeed,
rule-of-law values demand that law—particularly law enforceable by
criminal sanction—include sufficient detail to provide fair notice of
prohibited conduct,182 and policy studies emphasize the role of agency
advice in facilitating compliance with complex regulatory regimes.183
The development of detailed guidance by agencies, however, can
exacerbate the problems of routinized decisionmaking. Agencies, like
any other organization, may themselves suffer from similar
pathologies of routinization. The organizational development of
acceptable conditions for compliance freezes those procedures in
place; commitment to static routines then shapes regulators’
understandings of what is acceptable, and filters out ways in which
those routines may be insufficient in varied or changing
circumstances. The more formal the guidance, moreover, the greater
the procedural and resource barriers to revisiting accepted routines,
which increases their “ossification”184 and resistance to change.
The
resulting
dynamic
of
“organizations
regulating
organizations,” moreover, exacerbates the poor exercise of firm
discretion. Agency attempts to give content to broad delegations runs
into the same problems of rule-bound governance that prompted the
wide scope of regulatory discretion initially. Once agencies settle on
the specific behavior they believe will constitute compliance, a similar
mindset is likely to be integrated into firm practices and cultures. The
feedback loop between firms and regulators becomes a one-time
event, resulting in a shared knowledge structure that guides and
entrenches the behavior of each.

181. Bill Brenner, RSA 2006: A one-size-fits-all approach to compliance? (Feb. 10, 2006),
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid14_gci1165786,00.html
(last
visited Sept. 8, 2006) (attributing observation to Chrisan Herrod, Chief Security Officer of the
SEC).
182. See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51 (1999) (holding Chicago gang
congregation ordinance unconstitutional because it failed to provide fair notice of prohibited
conduct or establish minimal guidelines for enforcement).
183. See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 18, at 831 (urging a policy focus on ways
regulators can increase compliance assistance).
184. Administrative law scholars have, especially in the context of rulemaking, explored a
widespread concern that ossification has resulted in the failure of the administrative state to
govern efficiently and responsively. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60–62 (1995); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997).
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This phenomenon, in turn, emasculates administrative agency
review as an accountability mechanism for enhancing reasoned and
thoughtful pursuit of regulatory goals. When decisionmakers know in
advance the particular views of their reviewer, they behave as
“cognitive miser[s],” “avoid[ing] mental calculations that require
sustained attention, effort or computing power.”185 Their decisions
will be governed by an “acceptability heuristic,” whereby they will
settle on socially acceptable behavior without considering
alternatives, or interpreting complex or contradictory environmental
information. Once firm decisionmakers know the particular rules for
reaching a regulatory safe harbor, and once those approaches have
been integrated into corporate understandings of the compliance
environment, agency review is likely to exacerbate, rather than
ameliorate, pathologies of routinized behavior.
The failure of existing control tools to prevent unresponsive
ceremonial adoption of legal forms is aggravated by weak agency
review mechanisms and threatens the efficacy of regulation through
186
internal compliance structures. By permitting routinized “check the
box” compliance to supplant the reasoned exercise of discretion,
dominant models of regulatory control permit firm decisionmaking to
be subverted by predictable pathologies that undermine the range of
public law accountability norms.
A deeper understanding of organizational decisionmaking
suggests: (1) that administrative law must pursue additional
accountability tools to guide the regulatory decisions of firms, just as
it does with agencies; and (2) that these tools must reflect actual
decision structures and processes. The next Part, accordingly,
explores the lessons that the literature on firm decisionmaking offers
for remedying decision pathologies, and suggests ways to integrate
these lessons into mechanisms for rendering private regulators
accountable.

185. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected Social Context of Judgment
and Choice, in 7 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 297, 311 (Barry M. Staw & L.L.
Cummings eds., 1985).
186. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (arguing that these models of regulation “do not deter prohibited
conduct within firms and may largely serve a window-dressing function that provides both
market legitimacy and reduced legal liability”); see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational
Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571 (2005) (arguing that
organizations have perverse incentives to implement ineffective compliance programs).
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR REGULATED FIRMS
If traditional methods for controlling the exercise of regulatory
discretion by private firms prove incomplete, how might policymakers
develop additional tools to render firm regulatory discretion
accountable? One way would be to apply the specific accountability
mechanisms that govern administrative agencies. Indeed, a growing
body of scholarship has explored applying such mechanisms to
standard-setting bodies like the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN),187 and private government
contractors that administer social services, prisons, and other
programs.188
Such accountability tools, however—including public notice and
comment, broad judicial review, and the expansion of the state action
doctrine to cover the administration of public programs by private
actors—are ill suited to manage regulated firm behavior. They would
impose great costs with little payoff.189
Specifically, opening firm processes generally to public comment
and broad judicial review would impose costly and time-consuming
procedures on every regulated firm, with even more detrimental
consequences for the broader economy. It would strain both privacy
commitments rooted in constitutional property protections, and
policies of corporate secrecy intended to encourage vigorous
competition and promote innovation. Such a fundamental policy shift,
even if politically tenable, would endanger the very private-sector
initiative that broad regulatory delegation seeks to harness for public
ends.
Furthermore, such mechanisms would be largely ineffective. As
an initial matter, concerns about regulated firm discretion fall below
the state action doctrine’s constitutional radar. Moreover, judicial
standards arising from the APA and tailored to agencies are simply
inapplicable in the private firm context. Judicial review separated
from evaluative principle offers no logic to guide the external

187. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around
the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000) (critiquing the formation and use of
ICANN as a means to avoid public rulemaking).
188. See Metzger, supra note 13.
189. See generally Freeman, Private Role, supra note 12, at 593 (discussing examples of
contexts in which private actors participate in regulation that “underscore the limitations of
traditional accountability mechanisms and suggest alternative incentives, checks, controls, and
monitoring tools that might supplement or supplant them”).
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monitoring of the substance of firm decisions. Finally, a broad public
comment requirement provides a blunt instrument, inapt for guiding
regulatory delegation. The costly procedures would neither further
the regulatory goal of enlisting firms to tap into their superior
knowledge about the workings of their company, nor target
pathologies that lead to irrational decisions.
The mismatch between certain traditional accountability
mechanisms and the regulated firm context, however, does not mean
that administrative law is silent as to how firm decisionmaking might
better be guided by public law norms. Indeed, a number of scholars,
led by Jody Freeman, have suggested a version of accountability that
varies according to the specific “administrative arrangement,” and is
tailored according to a context-specific assessment of the dangers
inherent in a particular regulatory structure.190
This Part takes up Freeman’s suggestion in the context of
regulatory delegations to private firms. Guided by the accountability
model’s emphasis on rationality, responsiveness and reviewability as
pertinent measures when observable outcomes are unavailable or
insufficient for assessing discretion’s exercise, this Part suggests
frameworks for thinking about regulated firm behavior in light of the
particular accountability shortcomings discussed in Part II. More
specifically, it first examines the ways in which decisionmaking
pathologies that distort the effects of the regulatory environment
might be mitigated by that same environment. It then suggests three
ways in which mitigation tools can be integrated into the regulatory
structure, with particular reference to regulatory initiatives, like the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that show promise as accountability tools, and
others that do not.
This Part does not claim to offer a complete or exclusive
accountability schema for regulated firm decisionmaking. It addresses
only the cognitively rooted threats to administrative law values in
firm decisionmaking, and is intended only to supplement other
approaches. Moreover, it only provides examples of the types of
“cognitive accountability” tools that might be employed by
190. Id. at 665 (“The appropriate response to shared governance instead requires highly
contextual, specific analyses of both the benefits and the dangers of different administrative
arrangements, together with a willingness to look for informal, nontraditional, and
nongovernmental mechanisms for ensuring accountability.”); see also id. at 580 (discussing how
the application of the state action doctrine fails as a general accountability mechanism because
it does not “tailor procedural protections to the specific threats posed by a particular regulatory
regime in which both public and private decisionmakers play a significant role”).
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regulators. Yet these examples suggest more general approaches that
can guide administrative agencies when integrating cognitive
understandings into the regulation of private decision processes, and
policymakers in more accurately gauging the costs and benefits of
regulation.
A. Administrative Law Lessons and Decision Pathologies
As discussed in Part I, administrative law responds to the
stumbling blocks inhibiting good agency decisionmaking by including
a variety of differently situated actors in the decision structure,
thereby using outside influences on internal decision processes to
promote public norms. This focus on process, rather than just
substantive outcomes, further provides a measure by which external
parties can assess the administrative exercise of discretion, permitting
meaningful review through at least some modicum of decisional
transparency. In sum, administrative law relies on relationships and
interactions across organizational boundaries to shape regulatory
decisions within them.
Research into the ways in which firms overcome decisionmaking
pathologies suggests the promise of such an approach for regulatory
delegation. Although firm structures generate systemic pulls toward
irrationality in decisionmaking, corporate behavior does not usually
end in disaster. That is because decision structures, while robust, are
not static. Firms, and the individuals within them, learn. Their
routines change and their culture develops, often because of—rather
then in spite of—relationships with their environments.
The literature on social cognition identifies two types of
organizational learning. The first, “single-loop” learning, refers to the
type of learning associated with the adaptive side of firms. In a singleloop process, organizations respond to experience by adjusting their
routines and standard operating procedures in light of unanticipated
191
mismatches between expected or desired outcomes and reality.
Decisionmaking evolution at Nut Island,192 for example, reflected this
sort of learning. As in that case, although single-loop adaptation is
often efficient—and usually promotes formal decision rationality—it
can ultimately lead to the decisionmaking pathologies that distort
internal responses to external regulation.

191.
192.

CHRIS ARGYRIS ET AL., ACTION SCIENCE 85–88 (1985).
See supra text accompanying notes 154–58.
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In contrast, “double-loop” learning describes learning at a
“meta” level. Such learning occurs when decisionmakers recognize at
a conscious level, and then affirmatively question and challenge, the
routines, assumptions and understandings that inform their
193
decisions. This type of learning, which creates the mental distance
necessary to identify and address cognitively rooted decisionmaking
pathologies, can sometimes be initiated by actors within
organizational boundaries. But because those actors’ perceptions are
usually shaped by the same shortsighted knowledge structures they
hope to uncover and transform, internal change alone can be elusive.
The greatest possibility for learning, therefore, results when external
forces disrupt insular ways of thinking.
The remainder of this Part first draws on the organizational
learning literature to identify tools that hold promise for overcoming
decisionmaking accountability failures. It then suggests ways that
those tools could be combined to improve rationality, responsiveness,
and reviewability through regulatory design, restructuring relations
with third-party gatekeepers, and rethinking the interactions between
regulated firms and the agency.
B. Identifying Accountability Tools
1. Tools for Enhancing Decisionmaking Rationality. Just as
individual cognition provides the basis for understanding firm
behavior, it also grounds theories of firm learning. The administrative
and knowledge structures that govern organizational behavior are
developed to simplify the decisions made by individuals with limited
attentional and perceptual facility. Yet these very simplification tools
are the source of irrational decisions. Thus, for firm behavior to
change, certain decisions must be made more complex. At certain
junctures, individuals must be directed away from decision heuristics,
their attention focused on the task at hand, and their perception
attuned to the unfamiliar rather than the recognizable.
External shocks, of the type that occur naturally in the market,
provide the model for purposive attempts to improve decisionmaking
through direct measures. Whereas routines, by means of the Nut
Island Effect, mask gradual change through adaptation, rapid

193.

ARGYRIS, supra note 191, at 85–88.
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environmental transformations—external shocks—focus attention.
A bankruptcy within a sector, the merger of a competitor, or the
introduction of a new product in an industry all serve to shake up
existing assumptions and focus attention on the resulting competitive
effects. By creating new and memorable events, they also alter the
effect of the “availability heuristic,” supplementing the closed set of
information that had previously shaped the way decisionmakers made
sense of situations with additional considerations that force routines
to be consciously examined and reworked.
a. Assigning Responsibility. The simplest way to reproduce the
attentional effect of an external shock is to instruct a decisionmaker,
at a discrete point in time, to focus on a particular decision.
Psychological evidence suggests that even self-induced reflection can
change one’s perception of a situation,195 as can explicit recognition of
196
Indeed,
the knowledge structures governing one’s outlook.
“[s]imply thinking about an attitude object has been shown to affect
the representation of that object in memory.”197
Making individuals personally accountable for tasks signals the
importance of the task and fosters a sense of responsibility for the
outcome.198 In such circumstances, decisionmakers employ more
analytic and complex judgment strategies, and perceive the decisions
under consideration to be more significant and less reversible should

194. Martti Ala-Härkönen & David Rutenberg, The Dawn of Organizational Learning in
the Mining Industry, 19 RESOURCES POL. 205, 211–12 (1993) (discussing how a German mining
company used the “confusion and fatigue of an external shock as an opportunity for strategic
change”).
195. See Murray G. Millar & Abraham Tesser, Thought-Induced Attitude Change: The
Effects of Schema Structure and Commitment, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 259 (1986);
Angelo C. Valenti & Abraham Tesser, On the Mechanism of Thought-Induced Attitude Change,
9 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 17 (1981).
196. Walsh, supra note 117, at 293–94, discusses Colin Eden, On the Nature of Cognitive
Maps, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 261 (1992) and Rex Mitchell, Team-Building by Disclosure of Internal
Frames of Reference, 22 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 15 (1986). Professor Eden discusses how
cognitive mapping “may act as a tool to facilitate decision-making, problem-solving, and
negotiation within the context of organizational intervention.” Eden, supra, at 262.
197. Walsh, supra note 117, at 283 (citation omitted).
198. Chris Argyris, Good Communication That Blocks Learning, HARV. BUS. REV., July–
Aug. 1994, at 77–78 (discussing the importance of individual accountability, and communication
structures that surface, rather than mask, “the kinds of deep and potentially threatening or
embarrassing information” that leads to change, in organizational learning).
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199
they turn out incorrect. When it is made clear at the point of action
that an individual is actively responsible for a decision whether to
commit fraud, for example (rather than whether to permit fraud), the
200
likelihood of misrepresentation decreases significantly.

b. Expanding the Types of Information Considered. Prompting
decisionmakers to collect information systematically before making a
decision,201 to consider types of information they would not usually
contemplate, or to take account of “counterfactual” approaches, can
202
also mediate the biasing effects of preexisting knowledge structures.
In particular, the literature on organizational learning has identified
intrafirm benchmarking measures as particularly effective tools in
prompting decisionmakers to take account of information that their
knowledge structures might otherwise filter out. Intrafirm
comparisons overcome the effects of structural secrecy by transferring
information between subunits, and by comparing the performance of
subunits across the firm, which makes subunit routines more visible.203
They permit the operation of several other debiasing techniques, such
as making knowledge structures more explicit, and informing
decisionmakers throughout the firm of data that may refute as well as
confirm existing beliefs. Indeed, benchmarking programs have been
identified as a particularly powerful means of prompting

199. P.W. McAllister et al., The Contingency Model for the Selection of Decision Strategies,
24 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 228 (1979); Tetlock, supra note 185, at 316.
200. See Steven T. Schwartz & David E. Wallin, Behavioral Implications of Information
Systems on Disclosure Fraud, 14 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 197 (2002) (comparing the decisions to
issue fraudulent disclosures, and to allow an information system to issue fraudulent reports at a
given rate, and concluding that “making subjects more closely involved with the disclosure
reduced the rate of fraudulent disclosures by 30 percent”).
201. Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate
for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 13 (1998) (discussing processes in
organizations ranging from Motorola to hospitals).
202. See, e.g., Laura J. Kray & Adam D. Galinsky, The Debiasing Effect of Counterfactual
Mind-sets: Increasing the Search for Disconfirmatory Information in Group Decisions, 91 ORG.
BEHAV. HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 69 (2003); O’Connor, supra note 178, at 1241 (proposing
the establishment of the rotating role of “devil’s advocate” on corporate boards in an attempt to
avert “Groupthink”); Heimer, supra note 16, at 27 (“A practical adaptation to regulatory risk
and the regulatory cost of continuous innovation, then, that still addresses the human incapacity
to imagine alternatives is an insistence that an organization consider at least one or a small
number of alternatives.”).
203. See Carla O’Dell & C. Jackson Grayson, If Only We Knew What We Know:
Identification and Transfer of Internal Best Practices, 40 CAL. MGMT. REV. 154, 157 (1998)
(contrasting internal benchmarking with “[o]rganizational structures that promote ‘silo’
behavior”).
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decisionmakers to replace routinized identification and interpretation
of information with what has been called “mindful scanning” of the
environment. Benchmarking data can affect “mindfulness” in the
approach to knowledge; it prompts individuals “to include that which
is learned from experimentation on the fringes of current
operations.”204 This information, which dominant knowledge
structures might mask as an anomaly, may be the best indicator of
205
change, risk, or opportunity facing an organization.
The benefits of spurring mindful individual cognitive processes
can be leveraged by the relevant decisionmaker’s power within the
firm. Research on the decision process development suggests that a
leader’s articulation of a new vision for an organization or team can
provide the type of altered information environment that changes
206
knowledge structures more broadly. Moreover, when individuals
central to the chain of command are prompted to think differently,
they can more easily integrate their new learning into existing firm
decision structures, which heightens its legitimacy and chance of
207
success within the firm. Further, as discussed in the following
subsection, mindful decisionmakers—particularly if they have access
to other firm leaders—can widely influence decisionmaking
indirectly, by exposing others to a competing structure for making
sense of circumstances.208
2. Tools for Enhancing Responsiveness to Public Norms.
Indirect means of focusing attention and broadening perception

204. C. Marlene Fiol & Edward J. O’Connor, Waking Up! Mindfulness in the Face of
Bandwagons, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 54, 63 (2003).
205. See Karl E. Wieck et al., Organizing for High Reliability, 21 ORG. BEHAV. 81, 92 (1999)
(discussing how mindful organizations create processes to view localized failure as a sign of
generalizable problems).
206. Daniel J. Isenberg, Drugs and Drama: The Effects of Two Dramatic Events in a
Pharmaceutical Company on Managers’ Cognitions, COLUM. J. WORLD BUS., Spring 1987, at 43
(discussing instances in which dramatic events cause managers to focus on problem-definition
and problem solving and lead to revised images of individual and organizational abilities).
207. See Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies, The Legalistic Organization: Definitions,
Dimensions and Dilemmas, 4 ORG. SCI. 345 (1993) (contrasting the success of organizational
rules that are easily included in the existing chain of command with those that violate routinized
order and the chain of command).
208. Cf. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY:
THE EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE 191–93 (1980) (proposing a “multiple
advocacy” system for designing organizational systems of accountability, in which those at the
top remain neutral while those from different subunits, governed by different routines, make
competing proposals).
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provide equally important tools for firm learning. Principal among
these is interaction with others whose thought processes are not
governed by the same culture or knowledge structures as the decision
209
Indeed, changes in decisionmakers’ “information
maker.
environment” provide some of the most powerful sources of learning,
whereas environmental stability impedes learning and encourages the
210
ossification of routines. Thus, hiring new personnel unfamiliar with
organizational routines—or even creating teams with representatives
from different subunits within the firm—prompts changes in
knowledge structures, whereas long tenures with an organization
enhance the perceptual screens related to decisionmaking
pathologies.211
The strength of this organizational learning technique is reflected
in the effects of firms’ participation in interorganizational
relationships such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, and other
networked affiliations.212 These are collaborations on which firms
increasingly rely for adaptation and learning.213 These relationships
form a locus of innovation precisely because the participants bring

209. See Heath et al., supra note 201, at 20 (“Often, organizations ensure that individuals
weigh information effectively by forcing them to interact with others who might weigh the
information differently.”); Walsh, supra note 117, at 291 (“[R]esearch on the process of
knowledge structure development suggests that a dramatically altered information environment
is often the locus of knowledge structure change.”).
210. Compare Jay W. Lorsch, Strategic Myopia: Culture as an Invisible Barrier to Change, in
GAINING CONTROL OF THE CORPORATE CULTURE 84 (R.H. Kilmann et al. eds., 1985)
(recommending job rotation across functional areas as an antidote to “strategic myopia”) and
Ralph Katz, Managing Careers: The Influence of Job and Group Longevities, in CAREER ISSUES
IN HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 154, 165 (1982) (same, as an antidote to “functional
fixedness”), with Gordon Walker, Network Position and Cognition in a Computer Software
Firm, 30 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 121 (1985) (finding that “industry veterans gradually failed to
distinguish between the different ways of achieving short- and long-term goals”). See also Anil
K. Gupta, Contingency Linkages Between Strategy and General Manager Characteristics: A
Conceptual Examination, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 399, 406 (1984) (arguing that managers with
functionally diverse career histories will make the greatest contribution to the firm).
211. Indeed this is the very problem that plagued the Nut Islanders. See supra text
accompanying notes 154–58.
212. See, e.g., Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of
Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116, 142 (1996)
(discussing knowledge creation as the product of interorganizational relationships which are
fluid and evolving, rather than intraorganizational ones that are tightly bound or static).
213. Id. at 119 (“A firm’s value and ability as a collaborator is related to its internal assets,
but at the same time, collaboration further develops and strengthens those internal
competencies.”); Christine M. Beckman & Pamela R. Haunschild, Network Learning: The
Effects of Partners’ Heterogeneity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
92, 97 (2002) (“[F]irms tend to learn more from outsiders than insiders.”).

01__BAMBERGER.DOC

444

12/19/2006 5:06 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:377

different experiences, and therefore different knowledge structures,
214
Firms in strategic alliances “explore their
to the venture.
experiences by collaborating with other organizations that are
215
different enough to create variety in their experiences.” This
exposure to experiential diversity, in turn, effects intrafirm changes,
as “[t]he organization internalizes what has been jointly explored with
216
other organizations.” By this process, the “[l]earning takes place as
a transformation of exploration between organizations to exploration
within the single organization.”217
The pattern of learning through joint ventures underscores the
type of external interactions that best promotes good internal
decisionmaking. Such “networked” interactions involve collaborative,
yet relatively discrete, relationships between firms and other wholly
independent entities: entities who also pursue a variety of goals and
projects unrelated to—and sometimes in direct competition with—
those of their partners. Their position external to the firm, but
cooperating with it, places them in a position to serve a boundaryspanning function.218 They serve as bridges to different ways of
understanding situations and making decisions; they make visible by
contrast routines that had remained unexamined within firm culture;
and they call attention within the firm to external data points that can
be used for benchmarking purposes.219 Moreover, because of their
independence from the firm, the knowledge that outside partners

214. See, e.g. Beckman & Haunschild, supra note 213, at 93 (documenting the benefits of
partner heterogeneity).
215. Mikael Holmkvist, A Dynamic Model of Intra- and Interorganizational Learning, 24
ORG. STUD. 95, 112 (2003).
216. Id. See generally C. Marlene Fiol, Consensus, Diversity, and Learning in Organizations,
5 ORG. SCI. 403 (1994) (emphasizing the importance of diversity in outlook on “the processes of
modifying one’s ‘cognitive maps or understandings,’ thereby changing the range of one’s
potential behaviors” (citation omitted)).
217. Holmkvist, supra note 215, at 112.
218. See generally Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360
(1973) (hypothesizing, in the context of social networks, that those with “weak ties” in the
network provide a bridge between groups with “strong ties”); Mark S. Granovetter, The
Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201 (1983) (reviewing the
empirical studies testing the “weak ties” hypothesis); W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS:
RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 203–13 (5th ed. 2002) (discussing “Bridging
Tactics,” in the context of “Boundary Setting and Boundary Spanning”).
219. See Andrew H. Gold et al., Knowledge Management: An Organizational Capabilities
Perspective, 18 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 185 (2001) (discussing the use of collaboration and
benchmarking to assesses the current state of organizational processes and to capture
knowledge for use internally).
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introduce within firm boundaries claims particular legitimacy among
220
insiders across firm subunits.
The promise of a network structure for overcoming
decisionmaking pathologies is demonstrated explicitly in studies of
firms for whom the interest in accountable and reliable
decisionmaking is paramount. These types of organizations, such as
nuclear power plants, hospitals, and aircraft carriers, reflect particular
sensitivity to the ways that efforts to simplify decisions can create
irrational outcomes. They therefore promote the thoughtful pursuit
of important goals by doing just the opposite: by making decision
processes more complex. This is achieved by incorporating in decision
structures a network of different actors and organizations with
different viewpoints. In this model of “negotiated complexity,” formal
and informal interorganizational agreements about how decisions are
made are repeatedly renegotiated and renewed, ensuring that the
homogeneity, specialization, and standardization that organizations
usually develop in the interest of efficiency are supplemented by
diversity, duplication, overlap, and a varied response repertoire,
221
which promote substantive reliability.
3. Tools for Enhancing Accountability Through Review.
Research into the psychology of accountability indicates that the
review of firm behavior by entities whose monitoring criteria are both
well specified and known to firm decisionmakers exacerbates the
substitution of cognitive shortcuts for reasoned judgment, and
promotes routinized “check the box” compliance.222 Yet that same
research identifies ways in which review can be structured to
223
“motivat[e] cognitive misers to be thoughtful.” Specifically, decision
pathologies are mediated in situations in which decisionmakers do
not know the socially “acceptable” response—or more precisely,
when those decisionmakers need to explain themselves to others

220. See Tanya Menon & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Valuing Internal vs. External Knowledge:
Explaining the Preference for Outsiders, 49 MGMT. SCI. 497, 505 (2003) (finding that managers
prefer knowledge obtained from outsiders).
221. See Martin Landau & David Chisolm, The Arrogance of Optimism: Notes on Failure
Avoidance Management, 3 J. CONTINGENCIES CRISIS MGMT. 67, 68 (1995) (discussing the
differences in patterns needed for efficiency, and those needed for reliability); Paul R.
Schulman, The Negotiated Order of Organizational Reliability, 25 ADMIN. & SOC. 353, 361–62
(1993) (discussing negotiated reliability); Wieck et al., supra note 205, at 81.
222. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
223. Tetlock, supra note 185, at 314.
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whose views they do not know in advance. This type of accountability
motivates people to become more vigilant, complex, and self-critical
224
information processors.
In particular, such accountability “motivates people to consider
arguments and evidence on both sides of issues in order to prepare
themselves for a wide variety of critical reactions to their views.”225 It
develops tolerance for cognitive inconsistency, so that a
decisionmaker recognizes good features of rejected policies and bad
features of accepted policies. It fosters a greater awareness of the
cognitive processes underlying the decision. And finally, it counters
the reliance on “existing knowledge structures in interpreting new
information,” making decisionmakers more willing to revise initial
impressions of the situation in response to changing evidence.226
Incorporating this type of review into structures for monitoring the
exercise of firm discretion, then, offers a useful tool for meaningful
“cognitive accountability.”
C. Learning from Organizational Learning: Three Administrative
Law Approaches to Cognitive Accountability
The combination of direct and indirect ways that external forces
overcome decision pathologies that would otherwise thwart
environmental influences offers a model for regulators.
Decisionmakers can step outside existing knowledge structures when
external stimuli prompt them to devote attention to particular
situations they confront, to account for unexpected information, and
to consider unfamiliar implications. They are particularly open to
learning as part of a dialogue with outside organizations informed by
different viewpoints—organizations that interact repeatedly but not
constantly, so that each retains its independent culture, approach, and
way of thinking. And these processes and interactions must not be
isolated, but recurrant and developing, so that new patterns of
decision resist ossification. In sum, internal firm decisionmaking is
rendered more accountable by outside influence on decision
processes and structural design.
This indicates the possibility of influencing the substance of
private firms’ exercise of regulatory discretion in ways familiar to

224.
225.
226.

Id. at 314–21 (reviewing research evidence).
Id. at 316.
Id.
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administrative law: process and structure. It further offers a renewed
capacity for agencies to promote the exercise of delegated discretion
in a rational manner constrained by public norms and amenable to
outside review, while still drawing on firms’ superior knowledge
about their internal workings. In light of the research on firm
decisionmaking, promising features of existing regulation, examples
of individual firm regulatory decisions, and innovative suggestions for
regulatory design developed in other contexts, the following
discussion suggests three specific accountability approaches that
regulators might use to supplement existing control measures:
(1) administrators can regulate the attention of decisionmakers
directly; (2) they can promote networked decision processes that
enhance accountability; and (3) administrative agencies can develop
the capacity to participate in such decision processes themselves,
enhancing their role as educators promoting firm learning.
1. Directly Regulating the Decisionmakers’ Focus: Improving
Accountability Through “Attention Regulation.” The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, the principal legislative response to a perceived wave of
financial misconduct, focused on two primary areas: “enhancing
disclosure and altering incentives to change behavior.”227 The first
focus was intended to improve the transparency and accuracy of
information provided to the market; the second sought better to align
the incentives of firm actors and third-party gatekeepers with
regulatory goals. The Act has been subject to a host of criticisms on
both fronts. Scholars have argued both that the additional disclosures
added no information above what was already available to investors,
and that wrongdoers such as Enron had already satisfied many of the
Act’s substantive requirements governing the independence of
directors, audit committees, and auditors.228 Yet several aspects of the
Act, and some early indications of the response among regulated
firms, suggest its promise as a means of overcoming harmful cognitive

227. Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks at the
Practicing Law Institute—SEC Speaks (Feb. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch022803cag.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).
228. Professor Roberta Romano developed an early comprehensive critique, rooted in the
empirical literature, of Sarbanes-Oxley as “Quack Corporate Governance.” See Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance 97–98,
(Yale Univ. Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 04-37, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=596101 (arguing that the market had adjusted on its own to the information conveyed
by opaque financial statements).
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shortcuts in firm decisionmaking, and improving both rationality and
responsiveness in the exercise of regulatory discretion.
a. Improving Rationality and Responsiveness Through Attention
Regulation. The simplest way to overcome harmful cognitive
shortcuts is by providing external shocks that direct individuals to
devote their attention to, and feel responsible for, a particular
decision. When those individuals hold a central position within the
firm power structure, this direction of attention more easily translates
into systemic avoidance of decisionmaking pathologies. Attention
regulation, therefore, provides the most straightforward way for
regulators to promote the mindful exercise of regulatory discretion.
Section 404 of the Act229 mandates an annual evaluation of
internal controls and procedures for financial reporting. It specifically
requires, among other things, that management publish an assessment
of, and vouch for, the effectiveness of these controls. Section 302
further requires frequent reporting in periodic financial reports of any
deficiencies in the internal controls.230 The SEC’s implementing rules
require management to acknowledge its responsibility for the
adequacy of the company’s internal control framework and
procedures for financial reporting.231 The rules added new Item 308 to
Regulation S-K, which requires that the company’s management
include a report on the company’s “internal control over financial
reporting” in its annual report filed with the SEC.232 The
recommended revisions to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
would further define an “effective program to prevent legal
violations” as one in which a specific “high-level” individual or
individuals were identified as having overall program responsibility.233
They would also require periodic reporting on the program to
governing authorities by both those individuals and the people with
day-to-day responsibility for the program.234 Indeed, the existing

229. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
230. Id. § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
231. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274 (2003).
232. 17 C.F.R. § 210.
233. Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
1417 PLI/CORP 219, 225 (2004).
234. Id. at 229.
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Guidelines mandate periodic assessment of the efficacy of compliance
235
systems, albeit without reporting requirements.
An organizational learning perspective suggests four important
elements for promoting rationality and responsiveness in the
enactment of these provisions of section 404, the implementing
regulations, and in certain aspects of the corresponding proposed
Guidelines. First, the high level of publicity surrounding the Act’s
236
passage alone, and prominent enforcement efforts, suggests that it
will draw decisionmakers’ attention on the issue of compliance as
they consider “available” contextual factors that should guide their
decisions. The prominence of the issue further strengthens the
legitimacy of those parties within regulated firms—lawyers,
compliance officers and others—who advocate more comprehensive
attention to developing control systems, which facilitates integrating
such systems into existing decision structures and enhances their
effectiveness.
Second, for the first time, the certification requirements of
section 404, and the language of the proposed Guidelines, explicitly
place responsibility for thinking about control systems on particular
officers, who must articulate the reasoning behind choices made in
structuring the programs and attest to their adequacy in public
documents.
Third, section 404, by targeting the attention of powerful officers,
takes advantage of the fact that the benefits of mindful individual
cognition can be leveraged by the relevant decisionmaker’s leadership
role within the firm.
Finally, by requiring periodic evaluations, the Act and the
proposed Guidelines take steps to ensure that organizational learning
processes repeat at distinct and episodic intervals (rather than adapt
continuously). This is a demonstrated tool for preventing adaptive
routines from masking decisionmaking flaws and increasing risks.
This form of regulation, then, suggests a means for moving
beyond ongoing debate as to which types of ex post liability best deter
237
wrongdoing. Instead “attention regulation” aims to foster good

235. Id. at 220.
236. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Inc., Case No. 04 CV 2324
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2004) (charging individual defendants with, inter alia, false certifications
under Sarbanes-Oxley), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18638.htm.
237. On this question see Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 51; James D. Cox, Private
Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
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decisions ex ante, by choosing to promote responsibility in
predetermined officers, rather than threatening to assess blame
amongst all involved individuals after failures have occurred.
b. Improving Reviewability Through Attention Regulation. The
literature on organizational learning further suggests that the end
product of these attention-focusing requirements—the public report
assessing the company’s internal control—suggests additional promise
for promoting accountability through improved reviewability, with
attendant benefits for promoting the rational exercise of regulatory
discretion.
As discussed in Part II, the implementation of regulation most
often evades review, because it occurs through structures and
processes largely hidden within firm boundaries. The requirement
that these structures be examined, explained and assessed has two
effects. First, it promises to reveal at least the conscious and formal
compliance processes to scrutiny by both markets and regulators for
the first time. The internal control disclosures filed under section 302,
which report “material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in
238
internal controls,” display an encouraging degree of candor about
structural factors typical of pathological decisionmaking such as
communication blocks, poor segregation of duties, and corporate
culture.239
Second, the very process of reporting promotes the type of
cognitive accountability that results from reviewability. Regulatory
disclosure requirements, including those contained in SarbanesOxley, are usually justified in terms of empowering market or

(Autumn 1997); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be
Held Criminally Liable, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239 (2000); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic
Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV.
1345 (1982).
238. Internal Control Disclosures From September, COMPLIANCE WK., Oct. 12, 2004 (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
239. See, e.g., id. (“Companies continue to provide greater detail on problems identified
during internal control assessment and testing phases.”); June 2005 Internal Control Report: All
About Remediation, COMPLIANCE WK., July 6, 2005 (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(“Companies are describing extensive details about the measures undertaken to remediate
internal control weaknesses . . . .”); 92 Internal Control Disclosures in August, COMPLIANCE
WK., Sept. 8, 2004 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The number of August disclosures is
the largest monthly number . . . this year . . . .”).
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240
political actors by providing them with information. Yet regulatory
disclosure requirements can motivate firm officers to step outside
routinized mindsets, to consider alternatives and contrary evidence,
and to defend their choices in light of a wide variety of responses.
This can occur because individuals are forced to focus on, collect
information about, and assess the effectiveness of internal controls in
firm-specific contexts, and then to justify the choices to a variety of
political and market actors whose views may be unknown. Mark
Jensen, National Director for Venture Capital Services at Deloitte &
Touche and a member of the SEC’s Advisory Committee for Smaller
Companies, puts this even more strongly: “In thirty years as an
auditor, the one thing I could point to that changed management’s
behavior is 404. . . . [I]t created a sense of urgency on the part of
senior executives in a company to take their financial reporting
seriously.”241 Previously, he describes, he had trouble getting the
attention of CFOs and CEOs: “I can’t tell you how many times as an
auditor you ask to meet with the CEO and the CEO doesn’t want to
meet with you, and yet they’re the person who ultimately . . . is
responsible for what they’re telling the public. In some cases it’s even
hard sometimes to get to the CFO, because especially in the late 90’s
the CFOs many times w[ould] tell you: they’re ‘not accountants.’”242
Not surprisingly, given the absence of thinking about cognitive
accountability during its passage, Sarbanes-Oxley provides an
incomplete model of attention regulation. Most notably, it fails to
take advantage of a number of straightforward organizational
learning tools geared toward overcoming decision pathologies. It
could, for example, have required that internal control assessments
compare yearly performance benchmarks, or explain alternatives
considered and rejected. It could also have identified other types of
information that must be taken account of in specific contexts, such as
the Treasury Department’s requirement that regulated insurers
consider a number of specific factors in a detailed risk assessment to
comply with money-laundering statutes.243 Only more detailed

240. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999) (discussing those compelled disclosures that
are meant to affect market responses and those meant to affect political responses).
241. Mark Jensen, Panel Presentation, Conference on Post-Enron Corporate Regulation:
Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far (or Not Far Enough)? at the University of California at
Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law (Mar. 17, 2006) (on file with the author).
242. Id.
243. 31 C.F.R. § 103.137 (2006).
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analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley’s effects on internal cognition can
illuminate fully the ways these changes have affected firm
decisionmaking.
Yet the combined effects of these and other section 404
requirements on identifying and disclosing internal control
efficiencies missed just months before Sarbanes-Oxley’s
implementation,244 provide at least tentative support for the notion
that the certification process (at least as a newly implemented
requirement)
can
prompt
thoughtful
and
accountable
decisionmaking. In the words of one former CFO, “linking your name
to the program really puts it on the front burner of what you’re
245
thinking about.”
2. Encouraging Rationality, Responsiveness and Reviewability
Through Boundary-Spanning Relationships: Diversifying the ThirdParty Monitor Model. Knowledge structures both distort the
incorporation of external regulatory goals within firm boundaries and
diminish a firm’s responsiveness to the external organizations meant
to monitor the firm’s pursuit of such goals. The literature on learning
through exposure to different organizational cultures and mindsets
suggests a framework for using firm interactions across boundaries to
achieve the opposite: enhanced decision rationality and
responsiveness.
This account highlights two critical characteristics of successful
interorganizational relations that differ from firms’ distorted relations
with third-party or government monitors discussed in Part II.246 First,
the relation is collaborative rather than adversarial. The perception
that cross-boundary cooperation directly furthers organic corporate
goals mediates intrafirm resistance to learning and the detrimental
effect on creative thinking that arises from antagonistic monitoring.
Participant firms are more open to the debiasing effects of external
stimuli, just as they are to the wholly internal learning benefits
accrued when new personnel are recruited who bring different
experiences and cultural filters to decisionmaking.
Second, firms participating in interorganizational partnerships
remain what sociologist Karl Weick terms “loosely coupled,” in that
244. See infra notes 247–66 and accompanying text.
245. Telephone Interview with Stephen Tisdell, President, The Compliance Partners, in
Nashville, Tenn. (Sept. 24, 2004).
246. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
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they are responsive to one another, but preserve their separateness
247
and identity. Because of this characteristic, they often resist the
cultural co-option that can affect auditors in a more tightly coupled
relationship with the firm. Precisely because of their relative
independence, other organizations in a network can disrupt intrafirm
routines and improve decision structures by providing boundaryspanning knowledge of contrasting experiences, cultures, mindsets,
and habits.
The model of loose coupling between “partners” in
implementing regulation offers at least three lessons for structuring
regulated firm accountability.
First, it suggests the importance of reexamining and
experimenting with the role of existing gatekeepers—another
element of Sarbanes-Oxley. Section 404 of the Act requires the
independent auditor who prepares or issues the audit report on
financial statements attest to, and report on, the internal controls
assessed by management.248 Thus, for the first time, third-party
auditors are involved in making public assessments of internal
decisionmaking processes and structures, in addition to substantive
financial reporting. Such involvement provides two related types of
accountability: (1) frequent input by an independent party about the
rationality of decisionmaking structures and their public objectives—
as well as the attendant benefits of such review for prompting good
decisionmaking; and (2) reporting to the general public by an actor
(the auditor) with direct access to internal firm workings permitting a
type of review generally unavailable to either regulators or the
market.
Data about the Act’s early effects indicate that section 404’s
provisions show promise as examples of learning tools for regulatory
design more generally. In 2005, the first full year of Sarbanes-Oxley’s
effectiveness, over 1,250 publicly held companies (of a total 15,000)
disclosed material weaknesses in internal controls, while 1,200
restated earnings. Earnings mismanagement, which pre-SarbanesOxley was “endemic, and not due to ‘a few bad apples,’” especially in
poorly performing industries, “reversed abruptly” after the Act’s

247. Karl E. Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, 21 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 1, 3 (1976).
248. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2000 & Supp. 2003); see also supra
notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
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249
passage. And the biggest factor in 2005 restatements was errors
discovered through section 404 compliance.250
Most strikingly, 94 percent of companies that disclosed a
“qualified” opinion as to the effectiveness of internal controls after
the 404 deadline had certified them as effective as recently as the
251
previous quarter. Prior to section 404’s effect, “thousands of
executives made these claims with not only limited support, but
contradictory evidence.”252 Control problems were discovered,
however, once accountability tools—executive certification, auditor
assessment and reporting requirements—were implemented. These
discoveries arose independent of any change in the substantive
financial disclosure regime. New studies, in turn, reflect positive
effects on the market’s faith in the accuracy of Sarbanes-Oxley
reporting.253
This conclusion alone cannot indicate whether Sarbanes-Oxley
itself is wise policy. A balancing of the potential benefits with the
massive compliance costs imposed by the Act falls outside the scope
of this Article.254 It does, however, suggest promising paths for future

249. Daniel A. Cohen, Aiyesha Dey & Thomas Lys, Trends in Earnings Management and
Informativeness of Earnings Announcements in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods
(Feb. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=658782). The Act’s
efficacy as an attention-focusing measure was enhanced by highly publicized enforcement
actions, which the authors of this study identify as a source of likely damping effect on
opportunistic behavior. Id.
250. Melissa Klein Aguilar, Restatements Should Subside as 404, Lease Issues Fade,
COMPLIANCE WK., Feb. 14, 2006 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (quoting Lynn Turner,
former chief accountant of the SEC, and managing director of research, Glass Lewis & Co.).
251. See Leah Townsend & Mark Grulhe, Control Deficiencies—Finding Financial
Impurities: Analysis of the 2004 and Early 2005 Deficiency Disclosures, CONTROL DEFICIENCIES
TREND ALERT, June 24, 2005, at 1; Melissa Klein Aguilar, SOX 404 Deficiencies Preceded by
“Effective” 302 Reports, COMPLIANCE WK. (July 26, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
252. Aguilar, supra note 251 (quoting Tim Leach, the chief methodology officer for Paisley
Consulting).
253. Jeffrey Doyle et al., Determinants of Weaknesses in Internal Control over Financial
Reporting and the Implications for Earnings Quality (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/accounting/seminars/McVay.pdf) (concluding that the existence
of a material weakness per se results in lower earnings quality); Jacqueline S. Hammersley et al.,
Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and to the Characteristics
of Those Weaknesses Under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Oct. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=830848) (finding that returns are
significantly negative when material weaknesses are disclosed, and more negative when
management claims that the control system is effective, despite the presence of a material
weakness).
254. See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the SarbanesOxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too 31 (Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper No.
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experimentation and research about the ways in which a host of
private actors with whom firms are already used to sharing
information about internal firm workings—from accountants to
insurers—might be enlisted to improve decisionmaking.
Second, the loose coupling/partners model points to the
importance of enhancing regulatory-gatekeeper independence—a
theme evident in recent corporate law scholarship. This literature
focuses largely on remedying the skewed financial incentives that can
compromise the monitoring function. Certainly, the elimination of
economic inducements that create conflicts of interest provides an
essential component for ensuring independent gatekeeper judgment.
Additionally, it ameliorates some of the cognitive forces that skew
behavior, such as the self-serving bias that renders auditors
vulnerable to distorted firm mindsets. Yet an organizational behavior
understanding further urges policymakers explicitly to assess whether
proposals will enhance the structural and cultural independence of
third-party regulatory actors, as a means of spurring better
decisionmaking in the firms they monitor. This organizational lens,
for example, suggests the merit of simple requirements that firms
255
rotate auditors, and more sweeping reforms that would strengthen
the cultural independence that auditors as a group could bring to the
256
table.
Third and finally, the model of responsive learning counsels
experimentation with—combined with systemic and empirical

525, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=808244 (calculating the aggregate compliance
costs for American firms at $35 billion). The compliance burden is particularly great for small
firms. See Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/talley_012306.pdf) (providing evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley is
driving small firms to exit the public capital markets).
255. See, e.g., Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange Act Release No. 47,265, Public
Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 27,642, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,915, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2103, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm (describing how rules implementing Sarbanes-Oxley
§ 203 provide that an accounting firm will not be independent if either the lead audit partner or
the concurring partner performs audit services for more than five consecutive fiscal years of an
audit client).
256. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational
Intermediaries, Auditor Independence, and the Governance of Accounting (Colum. L. Sch., Ctr.
for L. & Econ. Stud. Working Paper No. 191, 2001) (proposing establishment of self-regulation
structure within the accounting profession as a means of developing self-discipline), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=270994.
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analysis of—the formal involvement of novel types of third parties
into regulatory implementation networks.
Insurers offer one promising paradigm for third-party
involvement in regulatory networks. Because insurers possess
significant data on risk across firms and industry sectors, they offer an
independent perspective on risks that may be missed by those internal
to any individual firm’s mindset. Moreover, insurers’ historical
practice of encouraging (by premium pricing), or requiring (as a
condition of coverage), risk-reduction measures on the part of
257
insureds offers an example of third-party involvement distinct from
the usual antagonistic monitoring model.
The activities of the Ethics Resource Center (ERC) provide a
second model for experimentation.258 The ERC is a nonprofit
compliance and ethics promotion organization which publishes the
biannual “National Business Ethics Survey” (NBES),259 a publicly
available survey of over 150,000 workers across industry. The survey
compiles, in a detailed manner, data on employee experiences with
risk assessment, misconduct, values, reporting, and compliance
systems in firms. The ERC also consults with firms seeking to
evaluate their own compliance and ethics systems. It conducts similar
surveys within those individual companies, the data from which can
be compared to the NBES benchmark, as well as against benchmark
surveys performed previously within the same firm. Over the years,
ERC clients have included two-thirds of the corporations in the
Standard & Poor’s Global 100 Index.
ERC’s paradigm suggests a number of ways in which third-party
networks can help overcome internal decisionmaking pathologies’
subversion of regulatory norms. First, the cooperative nature of the
relationship between the firm and the nonprofit permits access to
large number of employees working at various levels of the firm. Such
access can unearth types of information otherwise unavailable to

257. PAUL K. FREEMAN & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
THROUGH INSURANCE 24 (1997) (“The insurer, taking a cue from the nineteenth century
mutual companies, will often require its potential policyholders to undertake specific loss
reduction activities before receiving insurance coverage. In fact, insurance companies have
often been the driving force behind the implementation of safety procedures.”).
258. Information on the Ethics Resource Center comes from Telephone Interview with Pat
Harned, Acting President, Ethics Res. Ctr., in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 13, 2004), and Telephone
Interview with Cherie Raven, Analyst, Ethics Res. Ctr., in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 27, 2004). The
details of the defense contractor example come from the Raven interview.
259. ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2005.

01__BAMBERGER.DOC

2006]

12/19/2006 5:06 PM

REGULATION AS DELEGATION

457

either outside regulators or third-party monitors performing an audit
function.
Second, ERC’s collection of external benchmarks gives it the
ability to direct firm decisionmakers to consider information that they
had previously missed. This information, in turn, may make visible
the structural and perceptual decisionmaking pathologies prevalent in
their firm. An ERC survey of a large defense contractor, for example,
revealed—despite the company’s technical legal compliance with
filing and other formal requirements—a relatively high percentage of
employees observing what they feared constituted misconduct or
other compliance problems (56 percent), but a comparatively low
level of reporting up the line. The survey’s detailed questions
discovered that, although coworkers felt strong trust between one
another, they lacked trust that supervisors would take complaints
seriously, that they would be believed, and that firm routines and
systems actually reflected the articulated emphasis on ethical
reporting over performance measures.
Third, ERC’s relations with firms are structured so as to leverage
the impact of its findings. Not only does the nonprofit consult from
the position of an outsider, it also seeks to maximize the perceived
legitimacy of its advice by working only for senior officers with
firmwide management responsibility. These two elements provide
means to avoid the phenomenon by which similar concerns voiced
internally may be devalued as reflecting the internal politics of one
department, such as human resources or “legal.”
The power of network relationships between loosely coupled
organizations, each informed by different cultures and knowledge
structures, is suggested more broadly by Susan Sturm’s study of
corporate compliance in the employment discrimination context.260
Although Professor Sturm’s research does not explicitly focus on
social cognition, it discusses attempts to address “second generation
manifestations of workplace bias”261—bias which results not from
overt discrimination, but from firm-specific patterns of behavior that
are in many ways similar to the decision procedures and knowledge
frameworks discussed here. This type of bias, she describes, is also not
readily susceptible to rule-based regulation and monitoring.
Externally developed rules, general enough to apply across firms, will

260. Sturm, supra note 15, at 492–519.
261. Id. at 460.
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not “be sufficiently sensitive to context or integrated into the day-to262
day practice that shapes their implementation.” Success in shaping
firm behavior, as evidenced by a number of case studies she presents,
derives instead in large part from the participation of “[a] set of
intermediate actors, operating within and across the boundaries of
workplaces.”263 These intermediaries—professionals like lawyers,
human resource specialists, and compliance consultants, as well as
other interested parties such as unions and insurers—each belong to
“broader communit[ies] of practice.”264 They bring different sets of
norms to problem solving, provide pooled information about best
practices and the behavior of different organizations, and can
introduce
external
benchmarking
techniques
into
firm
decisionmaking. Together, they “foster[] the development of hybrid
forms of relationships between public and private norms, legal and
informal incentives, and contextual and general learning.”265 With the
participation of these mediating institutions, the employers Sturm
studied were able to “self-consciously design[] or revis[e] their
systems of conflict resolution and problem solving to address their
particular culture, power dynamics, and patterns of daily
interaction.”266
Consistent with companies’ market response of developing
networks to improve the effective implementation of legal mandates,
established patterns of organizational learning suggest that regulators
might enhance the responsiveness of firm decisionmaking by
involving other capable but independent market actors in networks of
accountability.
3. Encouraging Responsiveness and Reviewability Through the
Agency-Firm Relationship: Agencies as Educators.
Finally, an
organizational approach challenges regulators to conceive of ways to
restructure their interactions with regulated firms to promote
accountability in the exercise of regulatory discretion. As discussed in
267
Part II, the natural pattern by which regulator and regulated
develop shared understandings of compliance can lead to routinized

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 475–76.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 522–36 (discussing different intermediaries).
Id. at 537.
Id. at 519.
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
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behavior on the part of each, hindering the very exercise of
independent firm judgment that regulatory delegation seeks to
initiate. Indeed, a regulator-firm relationship in which agencies and
firms reach a static accord constitutes a paradigmatic example of
single-loop learning, with all of its strengths and weaknesses. The
unitary burst of mutual feedback typical of a regulatory rulemaking
process, for example, may spur the attentive development of
compliance routines. But without repeated interactions, it can lead to
cognitive complacency that masks insufficiencies over time. The
literature on social cognition and firm behavior challenges regulators
to develop double-loop learning techniques that prompt both parties
to make mindful decisions over time.
Sarbanes-Oxley, not surprisingly, rates poorly in this respect. The
SEC’s rules implementing section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley, for
example, are both general and static. They require only that
management base its evaluation of the effectiveness of the company’s
internal controls on a suitable, recognized control framework that is
established by a body or group that has followed due process
procedures, and that the framework be distributed for public
comment.268 The rules do not mandate the use of a particular
framework, but explicitly identify the one established by the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (commonly known as COSO) as satisfying the SEC’s
269
Although these rules, by requiring general control
criteria.
structures developed after public comment, nod in the direction of
the administrative law norm of public responsiveness, the COSO
framework contains few specifics to promote the rational exercise of
firm discretion. The framework generally requires oversight of
financial reporting by the board and an audit committee, highlights
good accounting standards, and emphasizes the importance of
“management philosophy and operating style,”270 but in the end, it
provides few additional means for achieving its recommendation that
“[p]ublic companies should maintain internal controls that provide

268. See, e.g., Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange Act Release No. 47,265, Public
Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 27,642, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,915, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2103, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm.
269. Id. at 6013.
270. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
34 (1987).
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reasonable assurance that fraudulent financial reporting will be
271
prevented or subject to early detection.”
The 2003 prosecutorial guidelines concerning internal controls
released jointly by the Department of Justice and the SEC at least
272
suggest the importance of dynamic firm decisionmaking. They link
compliance with general criteria implicated by decision pathologies,
such as the prevailing corporate culture, and whether a company has
a “responsive and evolving” compliance program under the
273
supervision of upper-level management.
The question is how agencies can provide guidance as to the
contours of a “responsive and evolving” program without reverting to
the static prescriptions like the COSO framework. The lessons of
organizational learning suggest that, without abandoning their
traditional functions as rulemakers and enforcers, agencies might
enhance their own role as a loosely coupled participant in a learning
network with regulated firms. Indeed, if top-down control techniques
are insufficient in light of systemic firm decisionmaking pathologies,
and the articulation of compliance requirements is similarly
compromised in promoting the exercise of bottom-up firm judgment,
then perhaps these approaches can be supplemented by side-to-side
involvement by regulators participating in networked accountability
relationships. While this suggestion merits more comprehensive
analysis beyond this Article’s scope, several approaches in regulatory
practice and scholarly literature hint at the direction that research
might take.
a. Learning from Incomplete Starts. Steps have been taken in
this direction, both through experimentation with more cooperative
models of regulation and through the individualized arrangements
put into place by settlement agreements following enforcement
actions. Both of these contexts provide suggestions for reconceiving
the agency-firm accountability relationship, although they do not
provide fully replicable models for across-the-board implementation.
Through regulatory negotiation schemes, for example, agencies
have negotiated the very content of administrative rules with

271. Id. at 33.
272. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, Regarding
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf.
273. See id.
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274
regulated parties. The “enforced self-regulation,” model associated
with Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite more generally sets forth a
paradigm in which individual firms develop self-regulation schemes,
which are reviewed and approved by regulators individually, and then
enforced against firms in the same way as governing law generally.275
Indeed, the SEC has emphasized that the “hallmark” of internal
276
controls are firm-specific “written policies and procedures,” and
could enhance its involvement and review of these documents
accordingly.
Regulatory negotiation addresses some of the accountability
problems of firm decisionmaking. Specifically, cooperative models
link regulatory design to the type of firm-specific information often
unavailable to regulators, but necessary for effective regulation. They
further mediate some of the distortive effects of decisionmaking
pathologies on regulatory inputs, like the damage that monitoring can
do to the intrinsic motivation to comply with the law, and the adverse
response to rules imposed externally.277
Yet although these approaches provide some depth to the
accountability toolbox,278 they do not specifically address the breadth
of behavioral problems that distort the decisions delegated to
279
regulated parties. Because regulatory negotiation is often a single-

274. See Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 12, at 33–35; Philip J. Harter,
Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 42–112 (1982) (proposing a detailed
“reg-neg” process largely adopted by the Administrative Council of the United States).
275. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 179, at 101–32.
276. Lori A. Richards, Speech at the Investment Company Institute/Independent Directors
Council Mutual Fund Compliance Programs Conference, The New Compliance Rule: An
Opportunity for Change (June 28, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch063004lar.htm.
277. See supra note 179 (discussing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation); Cunningham, supra
note 169, at 294 (discussing how framing monitoring as cooperation is a “deliberate
reorientation[] of the trust-suspicion model of internal controls”).
278. At the same time, others have noted, these approaches create other accountability
problems. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?,
in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY
INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 93, 97–98 (Eric Orts & Kurt Deketelaere
eds., 2001) (criticizing the shift in power from accountable government administrators to private
parties).
279. Moreover, even supporters of the collaborative model recognize the limited situations
in which it can be applied. See, e.g., Freeman, Private Role, supra note 12, at 652–53 (discussing
the “fragile conjunction of ingredients” on which the success of audited self-regulation rests,
such as strong stakeholder representatives, shared understandings among stakeholders, and
intensive agency involvement with the process of implementation). See generally Parker, supra
note 23, at 542 (citing many individual self-regulation schemes that “have been shown to have
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shot event, it alone cannot address the cognitive frames, routinized
responses, and systemic pulls to myopic judgment that shape both
organizational behavior generally and the implementation of legal
norms more specifically. Indeed, by definition, even enforced selfregulation ultimately rests on external monitoring. Its reliance on ex
post audit diminishes the model’s ability to curb decisionmaking
pathologies before they occur, and requires an assessment of
decisions by third parties without meaningful access to the routines
buried deep within a firm’s decision structures.280
The benefits of enforced self-regulation are preserved, and the
shortcomings diminished, in settlement agreements reached after
initiation of an enforcement action. In these instances, agencies have
the leverage to work on an ongoing basis to ensure that they remain
part of a continuing dialogue with errant regulated parties seeking to
reconstruct internal processes to better comply with legal mandates.
The agreement entered earlier this year by the SEC and Warnaco,
Inc., for example, required that the company hire an independent
third-party consultant to perform a complete review of firm inventory
systems, internal audit, financial reporting and other accounting
functions, and required that the company adopt the recommendations
of the independent consultant within 180 days.281 Other settlements

failed”); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for
Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 413 (2000) (suggesting that collaborative
approaches be limited to “a facility-by-facility basis, in situations characterized by participants
who form a community of individuals with some common interests, and in which those
participants who represent the interests of stakeholders in the regulatory process are
accountable to those stakeholders”).
280. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 61, at 74 (discussing the ways in which a system that
sanctions firms for having poor compliance systems and gives bonuses for having good ones
“necessarily means that a fact-finder has to make a reasonableness determination with respect
to any given system”); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints
on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 452 (1999) (noting, in the context of ex post
review of agency decisions by experts, that “[g]enerally, it is difficult for an agency or an
external monitor to know when use of a norm is justified”).
281. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Settlement with Warnaco, Former Warnaco
Executives, and PwC for Financial Disclosure Violations (May 11, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-62.htm.
Settlements involving environmental violators have reflected particular creativity. In the
case of Balzers Corporation of Hudson, New Hampshire, for example, the EPA agreed that a
regulatory fine could either be paid directly to the government or used toward capital
improvements that reduced pollution. The firm chose the latter option, which involved
integrating the plant process development staff into the environmental compliance structure.
Together the integrated team discovered that it could reduce the costs of cleaning optical
components, semiconductors, and compact discs by as much as $100,000 per year—as well as
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have more explicitly involved placing agents approved by the SEC,
such as former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, within the firm to
282
supervise compliance implementation.
These examples, however, cannot be reproduced directly as a
universal model for SEC regulation. Outside the enforcement
context, agencies neither wield the power nor claim the resources
necessary to work with regulated firms so intensively and individually.
However, in their focus on actors inside the firm and on dynamic
agency involvement in firm-specific compliance, individual
settlements suggest tools that might be reproduced more broadly.
b. A More Sustainable Model—Double Agents and Agency
Educators. The tools of organizational learning, the model of
networked decisionmaking, and the partial successes of the
negotiated and settlement models, suggest a two-track paradigm for
agency action as a loosely coupled participant in developing
responsive and evolving compliance programs.
First, agencies can take advantage of the professionalization of
compliance to cultivate “double agents” within firms, boundaryspanning carriers who can bring independent mindsets to bear during
firm decisionmaking. Certainly, the SEC cannot place a Richard
Breeden within each firm’s boundaries. Yet it can consciously exploit
the general counsel in each firm, and increasingly, the professional
compliance officer. Agencies can nurture agents inside the firm who
can help mitigate systemic decisionmaking pathologies through a
variety of means: nurturing relations with professional compliance
organizations as it does with the American Bar Association,
increasing public awareness and education in ways that accord
compliance officers greater legitimacy within the firm, and

achieve significant environmental improvement—by switching technologies from a Freon-based
to a water-based system. Because established structural arrangements within the firm did not
allow for a compliance strategy with process department input, the potential for mutual gain
was not previously explored. See Max H. Bazerman & Andrew J. Hoffman, Sources of
Environmentally Destructive Behavior: Individual, Organizational, and Institutional Perspectives,
21 RES. ORG. BEHAV., 39, 49 (1999).
282. See, e.g., Former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden to Supervise Distribution of SEC’s
Civil Penalty Against WorldCom, SEC Litigation Release No. 18451 (Nov. 10, 2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18451.htm; Christopher Traulsen, RS Funds:
Proceed with Caution, MORNINGSTAR REPORTS, Oct. 30, 2004, http://advisor.morningstar.com/
articles/doc.asp?s=1&docId=3841&pgNo=1 (describing, as part of the settlement, the departure
of the former CFO, the hiring of new COO Terry Otton, and the transfer of certain compliance
oversight functions to him for twelve months).
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establishing regular lines of communication with individual
compliance officers. Indeed, in the summer of 2004 the SEC explicitly
announced, in light of the mutual fund scandals, a new compliance
rule grounded on the repeated premise that the Commission “will
283
look to the Chief Compliance Officer as [its] ally.” In the words of
Lori Richards, Director of the Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, “[W]e will develop that alliance—we will speak often
to the Chief Compliance Officer, utilizing her knowledge to more
completely understand the fund’s compliance program, to hear
concerns, and to understand emerging issues and the ways in which
they are being handled.”284
Director Richards’ comments suggest a more general role for
agencies as educators. Through periodic, but rather informal,
communication with firms, regulators can regularly update their
understandings of compliance challenges, and the ways in which such
challenges are overcome in heterogeneous environments. They can
then incorporate these lessons in evolving understandings of
compliance and communicate them back to firms, counseling when
appropriate about ways they may be adapted locally. This model
285
draws in important ways on the “Democratic Experimentalism”
approach explored by Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf. Reflecting
that approach, agencies could take advantage of their vantage point
on the behavior of multiple firms to develop “rolling best practices”
by collecting data from regulated entities about what works and what
does not, and then disseminating that information back, through
education and capacity building.286 Understood in terms of
organizational learning, a central job of administrative agencies in this
model would be to collect, and then to focus the attention of firm
managers on, different ways of thinking about problems. This serves
as a means of both learning about alternate approaches and making
visible the assumptions and structures governing existing firm
practice. As the “rolling” process repeats, firms are periodically

283. Richards, supra note 276.
284. Id.
285. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314–23 (1998).
286. Id. at 350; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen et al., After Backyard Environmentalism:
Toward a Performance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
692, 692–709 (2000) (providing, in the environmental context, a model in which administrative
agencies develop the architecture for gathering and analyzing information across local contexts
as a part of the regulatory and education process).
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confronted with performance standards that “are continually
287
ratcheted up as local experimentation reveals what is possible.”
Professors Sabel and Dorf’s pathbreaking work focuses on
developing and exploring bottom-up voluntary solutions to
governance problems, and largely concerns ways that public
institutions can improve information flows to and from local
experimenters. Its primary inquiry, however, is not the accountability
of local decisionmakers.
The challenge, then, is to develop ways to include a multiplicity
of accountability tools in agency-educator experiments. The
experimentalist model itself combines some of negotiated regulation’s
strengths in tailoring local responsiveness to public norms with the
direct dialogue benefits of the settlement paradigm. Yet its priority is
not the reviewability component—the “accountable to whom?”
element—that provides the impetus for permitting the regulator
privileged access inside the firm in the first place. Both negotiated
regulation and settlements, it might be said, are characterized not just
by cooperation, but by cooperation “in the shadow” of enforcement.
Thus, attempts to develop analogous broader-based models should
draw not only on the agency’s vantage point on the comparative
practices of other firms, but on the agency’s ability to leverage
enforcement threats as a means to bargain for cooperative
engagement.
Two regulatory initiatives suggest such models, although both
are nascent. The first, the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary port security initiative premised
on the cooperation of private U.S. and select Mexican companies.288
The program provides streamlined processes, as opposed to
burdensome security enforcement, for firms that meet certain security
minima, including “attention regulation” requirements that certain
managers be actively involved in developing and implementing
security measures. The program, for example, contains a requirement
that CEOs and corporate boards review security measures

287.
288.

Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 384, 399 (2002).
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTAINER SECURITY: EXPANSION OF KEY
CUSTOMS PROGRAMS WILL REQUIRE GREATER ATTENTION TO CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS
9 (2003); U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT): Partnership to Secure the Supply Chain, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/
commercial_enforcement/ctpat (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (U.S. Customs Service website
containing resources related to program).
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periodically, approve them, and remedy deficiencies that may exist.
Customs then shares the best practices of these firms with other CTPAT firms, including them in requirements for streamlined security
290
burdens.
The second example, analyzed by Paul Schwartz and Edward
291
Janger as an example of the experimentalism model, involves the
“Interagency Guidance” implementing Title V of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act regarding data security breaches.292 The Guidance requires
customer notice in cases of a reasonable likelihood of “misuse” of
leaked personal information—a disclosure that can result in
extremely costly reputational and monetary damages.293 But the
Guidance also provides for a “second track,” providing for disclosure
to the financial institution’s supervisory regulatory agency for a lower
level security breach: when a reasonable likelihood exists of
“unauthorized access” to the data. Thus Chief Privacy Officers are
given an initial “opportunity” (albeit mandated) to open the doors of
the firm to the regulator to “assess the effectiveness of an institution’s
response plan”294 before the decision regarding public disclosure is
reached. Regulators are thus provided with internal information,
involved in overseeing the critical decision regarding disclosure, and
given “an opportunity to consider steps other than notice to help
mitigate the harm caused by the breach.”295
Neither C-TPAT nor the GLB Interagency Guidance offer
perfect models for broader restructuring of agency-firm relations. The
C-TPAT, in its implementation, has fallen short in assessments of its
296
success in providing effective review. The Guidance, like the

289. See, e.g., U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY BEST
PRACTICES CATALOG, CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM 4 (2006),
available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_
best_practices.ctt/ctpat_best_practices.pdf.
290. Id.
291. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 33.
292. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736 (Mar. 29, 2005).
293. See generally Dominique Levin, Compliance—Burden or Opportunity?, SARBANESOXLEY COMPLIANCE J., Mar. 23, 2006, available at http://www.s-ox.com/feature/detail.
cfm?articleID=1688 (calculating possible costs of remediation, legal risk and “brand damage” at
$5–20 million per incident).
294. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,752.
295. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 33, at 23.
296. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 288.
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settlement agreement examples it resembles, is only triggered after a
regulatory failure. Yet they—as well as nascent moves like New
Jersey’s announced intent to make chemical facility security best
practices collected by state regulators mandatory—do suggest ways in
which agencies, acting as the ultimate “double-loop” educator, can
promote the exercise of regulatory discretion consistent with public
norms. By learning in an ongoing manner about tools that are
effective in offsetting decision pathologies—such as particular uses of
benchmarking and other data to assess the effectiveness of control
systems—and incorporating those insights into guidance for firms,
they can better promote the rational exercise of regulatory discretion.
By providing a different cultural filter for looking at specific
regulatory problems in discussions with compliance officers, or
communicating effective ways in which other firms have cooperated
with external organizations like insurers or industry groups, they can
improve responsiveness to regulatory goals. And by embracing
evolving, rather than static, understandings about compliance, they
may be able to avoid the traps of “check the box” compliance,
prompting mindful thinking processes through review, and enhancing
accountability.
CONCLUSION
The delegation of decisionmaking to regulated parties presents a
conundrum. Regulators need to rely on private actors to assess and
manage risk. The costs of failure are significant, in terms of harm to
specific individuals, injury to faith in markets, and risk to persons and
property more generally.
At the same time, the structure of firm-specific decisions does
not lend itself to regulation by top-down command; nor do regulators
have a clear yardstick by which to assess firms’ bottom-up efforts at
governance. Such delegation, then, in the words of one prominent
administrative law scholar, “misleads us into thinking that the firm is
being supervised or controlled, while in actuality it can violate
297
applicable public norms with impunity.”
By integrating a public accountability approach with
understandings of decisionmaking in the private sector, this Article
provides a starting point for research in thinking about these issues.
Incorporating organizational learning approaches into regulatory and
297.

Rubin, supra note 83, at 2109.
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agency design offers a means to spur more rational, responsive, and
accountable decisionmaking without having to rely exclusively on the
imperfect and costly tools of monitoring and punishment. Moreover
such approaches offer the potential to improve the efficacy of internal
control processes on which firms are already expending substantial
resources.
In proposing a suite of accountability tools, this Article looks to
research on individual judgment and organizational behavior. In so
doing, it focuses scholarly attention on the cognitive dimension of
existing regulatory structures, to ensure that social cognition will be
considered when developing future policy. It then sketches three
contexts in which this cognitive dimension might be brought to bear.
This blueprint is intended to provide direction for empirical analysis
that can indicate the relative successes and costs of such policy
approaches. The hope is that policymakers in a host of contexts in
which risk plays a role, will be armed not only with accurate
information about the costs of requirements intended to guide the
exercise of regulatory discretion, but also information about their
efficacy in promoting the accurate and accountable implementation
of public goals.

